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Resistance is No Longer Futile: Women's Rights in Lebanon

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Resistance is No Longer Futile: Women's Rights in Lebanon

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my Grandma Joyce and my Grandma Partain for being two exceptional examples of strong women in my life, as well as to all of my family who taught me that gender equality is not a privilege, it is a right (Mom, Paige, Dad, Daniel). I would also like to dedicate this to all of the women who have been left without a voice as a result of gender-based violence. May you be heard through my writing.

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Abstract

Resistance is No Longer Futile: Women's Rights in Lebanon

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This thesis focuses on the current state of women's rights in Lebanon. Due to gender inequality, wider systems of violence, and institutionalized methods of disenfranchisement such as Lebanese personal status laws and the Kafala system, a sponsorship system for migrant domestic labor, women and children are most vulnerable to violence. Despite these pervasive systems of patriarchal dominance, it has thus far been difficult to fight gender-based violence in Lebanon because the country promotes a superficial appearance of equality. This thesis discusses how the women's rights organization KAFA, meaning "Enough" in Arabic, could ignite a women's movement in a country, like Lebanon, that has experienced limited progress for women and prolonged national violence.

My thesis begins with an interview with the Communication Director of KAFA, followed by a discussion of KAFA's different campaign strategies to engage the state apparatus, the public sphere, and the migrant and refugee community. I then illustrate how KAFA implements its campaigns through mass media and other visual culture, incorporating audience responses to these strategies into my discussion. Finally, I analyze these campaigns strategies in relation to each other, focusing on the implications of the audiences' responses.

I argue in this thesis that in order for KAFA to launch a women's rights movement under current social and political conditions in KAFA, it must first employ strategic campaigns to confront forms of gender-based violence at the state and community levels, appealing to a wide audience and building support across campaigns. Constructing webs of activist support across campaigns is crucial for combatting patriarchal oppression regarding socioeconomic and nationalist differences that a part of KAFA's audience reproduces in their responses to campaigns. These issues are particularly evident in responses regarding those working under the Kafala system, a form of modern day slavery. KAFA uses these contentious responses, however, as an opportunity to educate and raise awareness, educate, and prevent gender-based violence. KAFA's campaign strategies have led to an increase in volunteers and activists participating in KAFA, which I argue places the organization in a unique place to build a women's rights movement in Lebanon.

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Introduction: A Progression of Violence

Women in Lebanon are vulnerable to conflict and violence. Though women's susceptibility to these threatening conditions is hardly location specific given worldwide patriarchal prominence, it is important not to conflate all women's experiences. Women living in Lebanon experience vulnerability stemming from a tumultuous Lebanese history and unique societal structures. As a result, these women reside in a very precarious position when facing violence that is condoned, often passively, by the state. I explore in this thesis Lebanese women's rights organizations strategically raising national awareness for gender-based violence while building a women's movement in order to confront these crucial issues.

Lebanon is a country born from violence. From the formation of the modern Middle East in 1919 following World War 1, resulting in the French mandate and the French formation of the Lebanese Republic in 1926, to the ever-present sectarian violence, Lebanon has experienced a constant undercurrent of bloody warfare or foreboding negative peace.[1] A product of the nation's mixed identity, or rather, lack of a cohesive national identity, its sectarian identity differences resulted in the explosion of armed conflict and regional violence repeatedly throughout Lebanon's young history.

[1]Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." The term "negative peace" is taken from Johan Galtung's research paper "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research". The term comes from his discussion of personal and structural violence. Personal violence describes a situation where one actor commits violence against another person. Structural violence, however, describes the presence of widespread violence as a result of power differences or widespread inequality. Negative peace describes a situation where structural violence is present.

This violence is a result of different religious and tribal communities forced under the banner of one nation and one government, with every group vying for political control and primacy. After the formation of the modern Middle East, the 18 recognized religious denominations came together to form a confessional government within a Parliamentary Democracy. According to the Constitution, a Maronite Christian always holds the Presidency, a Shi'ite Muslim always holds the position of the Speaker of the House, and a Sunni Muslim always holds the position of the Prime Minister, with the Parliament proportionally divided between all 18 religious groups.[2] While the Lebanese often boast about their democratic form of governing, there is constant contention regarding the power allotted to each confessional group, often resulting in sectarian conflict and disputes.

These sectarian rifts and communal disputes led to a 15-year Lebanese Civil War from 1975-1990, destroying lives, history, and the economic and architectural infrastructure of most of the country. While much of this violence was directed inward, other regional neighbors became involved in the conflict at times. During the Lebanese Civil War, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon in 1982 after numerous incidents with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Syria also went into Lebanon 1976 and did not truly leave until 2005. The end of the Lebanese Civil War with the Ta'if Agreement in 1989 brought the formal end of the war, with the ground fighting ceasing in 1990. The end of the war did not bring a lasting peace, however, and many of the Lebanese groups would continue engaging in violence and fighting with various groups over the next two

[2] JOSEPH, "Political Familism in Lebanon." pg. 158

decades. During this time, the rest of the country found itself in a situation of negative peace, carefully navigating around those of other sectarian backgrounds to avoid instigating local skirmishes. [3]

Violence against women, primarily committed by males, is intimately connected to the national and political violence permeating Lebanese history. Though political violence is not the only cause of domestic violence, there exists a correlation between political violence and violence committed in the home. Lebanon does not now, nor has it ever, kept statistical analysis on domestic violence. The lack of statistics makes it difficult to surmise the full extent of violence women experienced during the Lebanese Civil War. Although these statistics do not exist, it is reasonable to surmise several general ideas regarding violence from other sources: 1. Women experience a variety of violence during wartime, from displacement to rape, 2. Violence during times of warfare increases domestic violence in the home, and 3. Exposure to domestic violence in the home increases the likelihood of witnesses reproducing the violence in the future.[4]

Though Lebanon does not keep statistical evidence regarding the levels of domestic violence in the country, the few existing studies regarding these issues illustrate the connection between wartime violence and violence in the home. In "Women, War, and Violence-Surviving the Experience," Jinan Usta, Jo Ann M. Farver, and Lama Zein interviewed 310 women at the Ministry of Local Affairs to assess their exposure to various forms of violence during the 2006 War between Hezbollah and Israel. In addition

[3] Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, "Domestic Violence." pg. 209, taken from the following study: Kessler RC, Molnar BE, Feurer ID, Appelbaum M. Patterns and mental health predictors of domestic violence in the United States: results from the National Comorbidity Survey. Int J Law Psychiatry 2001;24:487–508.
[4] Ibid. pg. 209

to bodily violence, this study states that women were six times as likely as men to develop posttraumatic stress symptoms regardless of the comparative level of exposure.[5] Additionally, the study notes the possible evidence for increased violence within the home as a result of violence outside of the home during and following the war.

Though this article cannot directly correlate the instances of violence women experienced during the 2006 War to violence after the war, it does illustrate a large number of women who experienced domestic abuse from this sample. Of this sample of women in regards to violence during the 2006 War, a high percentage of women experienced bodily violence through displacement, violence associated with armed conflict, and several types of physical abuse including hitting, pushing, kicking, being threatened with a weapon, and sexual abused.[6] Significantly, 33% of the women being interviewed experienced violence following the war, with 92% of these women coming from the group that had also experienced violence during the war.[7] Though the women were not asked about their experiences with violence prior to the Lebanese war, they did note that during the war, "their husbands were highly irritable and edgy, under much psychological stress because they felt they had 'lost everything,' and that they tended to let out their stress on their wives."[8] These statements share similarities with women in other conflict zones, on which Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian reflects, "Furthermore,

[5]Usta, Farver, and Zein, "Women, War, and Violence." 794
[6] Ibid. pg. 797-798
[7] Ibid. pg. 798
[8] Ibid. pg. 798

militarization constructs Palestinian women as boundary markers, often becoming the punch bag for the men outside and the punch bag for the men inside."[9]

During times of war, women are exposed to violence through both their enemies or invaders and their situations at home. Women's bodies demarcate the division between outer and inner identities. Outside, the men from their clan attempt to protect the women from the opposing forces; the impregnation of a women's womb symbolically represents the dominance of the other group and literally represents the infiltration of the invaders. Inside, men act out aggression towards the women in the household. Whether because of the stress of outside conflict, or because the men are reproducing the patriarchal dominance in their own home that they are facing in the warzone, women experience the brunt of masculine anger.

Unfortunately, issues of violence create a self-perpetuating cycle that is difficult to break. As noted, Lebanon has experienced conflict and violence since before its creation as a modern nation state. There was intensified violence between Christians and Muslims during the 1950's, followed by the extremely violent and bloody 15 year Lebanese Civil War, the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, and a continuous situation of negative peace between and after these major wars. All aforementioned situations resulted in the trauma of Lebanese citizens and a normalization of violence. In *Domestic Violence, the Lebanese Experience*, the authors discuss how though the underlying problem of gender inequality leads to violence, the long history of Lebanese violence led to a normalization of violence, an increase in domestic violence and rape,

[9] Lentin, "Palestinian Women from Femina Sacra to Agents of Active Resistance." pg. 168

and how, "not only have women become targets of men's aggression but that children have been 'socialized' into it."[10] Conversations regarding domestic violence in Lebanon often leave out children, but they play an intricate role in several ways. Children raised around violence may have difficulties recognizing that it is an inappropriate part of a relationship. Becoming normalized to violence also results in the children perpetuating the violence as adults. "The childhood experience of witnessing minor violence in the home was as important as witnessing severe violence in predicting subsequent intergenerational continuity of domestic violence."[11] In addition to children carrying violence into the next generation, husbands often use them as bargaining tools to gain control over their wives. The majority of the time, women are unable to gain custody, or permanent custody, of their children, and sometimes must decide if they will remain in an abusive situation to protect their children, or if they will leave an abusive situation and also have their children taken away from them.

Domestic violence of women and children is but one manifestation of patriarchal violence; rape and abuse of migrant domestic workers are also prevalent problems in Lebanese society. Violence against migrant domestic workers results from the Lebanese Kafala system, which gives the employer unmitigated control over the lives of his or her employees. The migrants coming to Lebanon, usually from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia, provide cheap labor without having any rights. Because the migrant worker is often seeking work in Lebanon in order to provide monetary funds for their family, the

[10] Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, "Domestic Violence." Pg. 210
[11] Ibid. pg. 209

employer pays for the worker to come to Lebanon. The employee then signs a contract in Arabic, a language often unknown to the employee, and is required to hand over their visa as collateral for the employer paying initial travel fees. Without a visa, the employee cannot go outside the home without fear of being caught and taken to prison, where they will possibly be sexually and physically assaulted.[12] The Kafala system results in employers having complete power over their employee, including the ability to abuse the migrant worker, withhold pay and visa, overwork and underfeed them, and give them no time off. The women within this system are economically in danger and vulnerable, both at home and abroad, which insures continued subjection to what many describe as contract slavery.[13]

There is also a gendered aspect to these cases, as the migrant domestic workers consistently name the "Madame," the female head of the household, as the abuser. The abuse from one woman to the other often stems from feelings of resentment or jealousy on the part of the employer and is her attempt to firmly establish class differences between herself and the 'other' employee. These problems also highlight a distinctly racialized aspect of the Kafala system: Lebanese society tends to discuss Sri Lankan women in particular in a pejorative way, treating them as racially or inherently dirty. They are fed leftovers from the main meal, expected to wash the bathroom after they wash themselves, or are given distinguishably inferior products to use.[14] The women are often beaten at home by the Madame, or on a less likely, or less reported, occurrence,

[12] Jureidini and Moukarbel, "Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon." pg. 598
[13] Ibid.
[14] *Ibid. pg. 586*

sexually assaulted by the mister in the household. If the maid attempts to run away, they often would be leaving their legal papers behind. Because the Madame or the employing household locks up the visa as collateral, the worker might not attain it before escaping. Thus, this situation places them at risk for capture by the General Security, a policing force known for beating and sexually abusing the majority of women that pass through their detention centers. If the employers believe the worker is misbehaving and do not want to discipline her themselves, they may take these workers to the recruitment office, where many officials themselves may beat migrant domestic workers.

A women's organization called KAFA, meaning "enough" in Arabic, and other women's rights organizations have taken special interest in migrant domestic worker abuses because of the increasing rate of suicide among these workers, such as the video showing Barcotan Dupree, an Ethiopian domestic worker, jumping from a window on November 10, 2014. Desperate to find a way out, these women take their own lives instead of continually submitting themselves to lives of contract slavery. Similar to cases of domestic violence against Lebanese women, statistics regarding the abuse of migrant domestic workers are difficult to find. According to Human Rights Watch, one worker died every week in 2008 from "unnatural causes, including suicide and falls from tall buildings."[15] To date, little has been done to remedy these conditions, and as a result, the Philippines has barred their citizens from taking new contracts in Lebanon. Despite the historical lack of attention paid to these issues with the Kafala system, KAFA, a women's

[15] "Lebanon."

rights NGO, and other migrant domestic workers groups are currently undertaking steps to gain rights for migrant domestic workers.

In addition to rape as a form of violence committed against migrant domestic workers, rape is a widespread phenomenon permeating every corner of society. Rape is underreported generally and lacks attention in Lebanon particularly. Yet it would be woefully ignorant to claim that rape does not exist. Though the lack of statistical evidence makes it difficult to conduct scholarship on rape in Lebanon, the widespread knowledge of occurrences of rape provide a basis for critical discussions of the topic. Marital rape is the most widely discussed form of rape in Lebanon, and currently exists at the forefront in the proposed law to protect women from domestic violence. Additionally, several studies conducted on the perception of rape and sexual violence in Lebanon indicates that, 1. It exists as an issue, 2. People are aware that it is occurring, and 3. People have an opinion regarding rape in Lebanon.[16] One study at the American University of Beirut conducted with 300 University Students analyzed the participants' views towards the victims of rape in Lebanon. The students were given a hypothetical situation where a woman is raped, with varying scenarios involving a change of the woman's relationship status and level of promiscuity. The woman's relationship status was categorized as married, dating, neighbors, or single, and the woman's level of promiscuity ranged from devout, divorced, married, promiscuous, to chaste. The study found that students considered the situation in which the woman, here the victim, is

[16] *Women, War, and Violence: Surviving the Experience, Lebanon Launches New Campaign to Combat Violence Against Refugee Women and Children, Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Case of 'Contract Slavery'?, Dimensions of gender-based violence against Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Perceptions of Rape and Attitudes Toward Women in a Sample of Lebanese Students*

married to the perpetrator of rape, as least likely to fall under the definition of rape. Additionally, the students considered the scenario in which the victim is dating the perpetrator of rape as less likely a situation of rape than if the woman and the rapist were neighbors or if the women was single and had no relationship with the perpetrator of rape. This indicates that the woman's relationship status or familiarity with the person that rapes her tended to determine the students' categorization of rape as distinctly rape.[17] Additionally, though the study states that the students tended to believe that the woman was raped regardless of her level of sexuality, the students were less likely to categorize the situation in which the woman who was raped was also promiscuous as a rape.[18] These views are particularly significant in Lebanon because there is not a law against marital rape. Women have little recourse in an environment where their relationship and level of sexuality determine whether or not rape will be considered rape to those they report the incident.

The persistent threat of violence against all women in Lebanon has resulted in numerous women's rights and domestic worker's rights organizations forming. Often these groups collaborate to champion each other's message for equality, supporting the idea that there is not equality for one group without equality for everyone. These groups work to garner wider public attention for their mission to protect women, families and migrant domestic workers. Two of the most prominent women's rights organizations,

[17] I would like to emphasize that this thesis is in no way indicating that there are degrees of rape. Rape is rape. Rather, this paragraph in particular focuses on the correlation between a women's relationship status and level of sexual activity and the students' perception of her as a victim of rape.
[18] Rebeiz and Harb, "Perceptions of Rape and Attitudes Toward Women in a Sample of Lebanese Students." Pg. 748

Nasawiya and KAFA, were founded fairly recently in 2010 and 2005 respectively. Each group fights for freedom from gender-based violence and oppression, though KAFA is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and Nasawiya is a member-driven collective, meaning that boards, staff, and volunteers do not form Nasawiya but that it considers its members all of equal standing. The Migrant Community Center in Beirut and Catharsis-the Lebanese Center for Drama Therapy tend to focus more on the rights and abuses of migrant domestic workers through organizing, networking, and language and other forms of learning. Each group works to dismantle the violent patriarchal system in Lebanon persistently abusing these disenfranchised groups.

Although war and various forms of violence twice impeded the progression of a women's movement in Lebanon, it also at times facilitated progress through disrupting social norms. Not solely a Lebanese phenomenon, war may disrupt traditional values in several ways such as: forcing women to take on the duties of absent males, necessitating women to work outside the home, as well as creating diversified interactions between non-related men and women. Lebanon's unique sectarian government and its long-standing interactions with French culture and international trade allowed for women's progress during these periods of conflict to remain intact in certain respects. As a result, Lebanon is often considered one of the most progressive countries in the Middle East, touting its history of women's rights providing women with access to education, the workplace, and liberties in public spaces. Yet these obvious liberties act as a smokescreen for the rampant inequalities lying just beneath the surface of this facade. The institutionalization of gender-based discrimination at times hides inequality and violence

against women, additionally making it a low priority compared with wider national concerns. Lebanon continuously struggles with keeping its borders secure and its lands free from proxy-wars, a problem it is currently facing in 2015 in its fight against the group Da'esh (The Islamic State). The Lebanese economy is also struggling to maintain nearly 4 million refugees now living in its small country, including Palestinians, Armenians, and Syrians. Nevertheless, these political and humanitarian crises all the more necessitate the protection of all women in Lebanon against gender-based violence and rampant inequalities.

This thesis utilizes the organization KAFA as a case study of how women in a country like Lebanon, with a history of a disrupted women's movement and the continual presence of political violence, begin the process of launching a national women's rights movement. My thesis argues that in order to initiate reform, KAFA must first raise awareness for gender-based inequalities and violence using accessible and impactful campaign strategies, then through simultaneously implementing campaigns while rotating emphasis on each campaign, build public support across campaigns to create webs of social activism while addressing socio-economic, nationalist, and religious divides. Finally, KAFA must utilize this momentum to place women's equality on the forefront of national concerns, linking its cause to the imperative issues of human rights abuses and the dismantling of larger systems of violence.

This project will focus on the women's rights organization KAFA and the strategies the group utilizes to disseminate its message effectively to the Lebanese people. The first section will engage KAFA's campaigns, which they implement via the

Internet and social media through understanding each campaign's goals and outlooks. The second section will look at what actually happens in these campaigns, illustrating Lebanese public participation and feedback, as well as mediated responses to the campaigns. The third section will consist of my analysis of the above campaigns and outreach techniques. I will evaluate the campaigns and their outcomes within a historical and sociological context, taking into consideration the implementation of each campaign at a particular historical moment. The analysis section also additionally illustrates how specific campaigns relate to KAFA's structure, methods, and goals. My project will make the claim that KAFA implements certain strategies that target specific forms of violence, each appropriately considering the audience, victim, and state structure that KAFA must navigate as a women's group in Lebanon.

KAFA's visual material, specifically photographs, documents, and videos, will be key to this thesis. I will also incorporate videos from other sources, including key YouTube videos that document specific cases that my analysis references. These, as well as journalistic and blog accounts, help determine wider feedback from the Lebanese public. Other outlets, such as television stations, have shown KAFA's videos. I will look at the different responses to these videos depending on the source of their exposure. I will also utilize specific cases of violence that sparked a remarkable response within Lebanon (as well as internationally). These cases, in addition to bearing witness, will ground the research in real instances of violence to give these women back their subjectivity and illustrate the progression of KAFA's creation, campaigns, and outlook.

This thesis centers on the KAFA organization, highlighting the pervasive system of gender-based violence in Lebanon. KAFA specifically targets family and domestic violence within the Lebanese household, as well as the Kafala system, a sponsorship system that allows Lebanese employers to engage in employment practices described as modern-day slavery. Regardless of religion, nationality, ethnicity, sexual preference or political affiliation, KAFA seeks to create equality for women and provide tools for a life free from violence. In order to embody this vision through textual analysis, this thesis will focus on KAFA's campaign strategies that target multiple points of patriarchal violence in Lebanon.

The first chapter describes KAFA's campaigns in great detail, placing each into its own spatial and temporal complex. I break down KAFA's campaigns into three separate strategies, illustrating the wider intention for each campaign. The first strategy is called "Engaging the State Apparatus." This Strategy illustrates KAFA's attempts to initiate change through approaching the judiciary system. Falling under this category, KAFA's Name and Shame campaign confronts the political system. Additionally its 16 Days of Activism Campaign discusses several sub-campaigns within this category, including the White Ribbon Campaign that implores men to get involved in fighting against gender-based violence and its Campaign with the Internal Security Forces that challenges the policing force in Lebanon. The second strategy is "Engaging the Public." In this strategy, KAFA attempts to engage the public through informational campaigns that also encourage audience feedback. The first campaign is called A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride, asking women to place themselves in the position of a witness of domestic

violence while also challenging them to intervene. The second campaign within this strategy is called Zalfa, a female avatar that poses questions and answers of questions that women have asked KAFA regarding gender-based violence. Zalfa also includes space for women to ask further questions and access to further information. The last campaign strategy is "Engaging the Kafala System." KAFA has conducted numerous research papers and panels since its founding in 2005, some of which are highlighted in this thesis. Additionally, the organization's most recent campaign is titled, "Raise Shawwa's Voice" and it confronts the dangerous Kafala system head-on, forcing its viewers and participants in the campaign to question their own biases and question the system that ends in so many migrant domestic worker suicides and abuses.

The second chapter discusses the on-the-ground results of KAFA's campaigns discussed in the previous chapter. The chapter opens up, however, with a brief description of the state of personal status laws in Lebanon. Understanding the nature of these laws is essential to placing each of KAFA's campaign strategies in a regional and political context. Following this description, the chapter breaks down each of the three strategies, Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala System, into discussions of: 1. How the news media, bloggers, and the mobilized public reacted and interacted with the campaign, and 2. How KAFA's Facebook page followers and YouTube subscribers reacted and interacted with the campaign. Whereas I garner information for the first question regarding the media, bloggers, and mobilized public from the sources themselves and give estimates as to the results, I utilize the specific

numbers of likes and/or dislikes, comments, and shares on YouTube and Facebook to provide tentative analysis for the audience's reactions.

The third chapter interprets the results from the previous chapter on reactions to KAFA's campaigns, while conducting cross-content analysis placing each campaign within a larger system of inquiry. Stating the significance of my work and the necessity for future work needing to be done on gender-based violence in Lebanon, this final chapter contemplates the current state of women's rights and the possibility for its future. Perhaps most significantly, I utilize the last chapter of my thesis to critique women's rights participants who not only reproduce the patriarchal structures they advocate against, but actively promote gender-based violence through extreme racist positions. Despite these obstacles for KAFA to overcome, the organization occupies a unique place in Lebanese culture to advance equality for all women and facilitate the beginnings of a robust women's movement in Lebanon.

In conclusion, my thesis will illustrate how KAFA utilizes the campaign strategies of Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public Sphere, and Engaging the Kafala System to raise awareness regarding gender based violence in an accessible way while building support across sectarian, socio-economic, and nationalist lines. Through offering its services to all women and children in Lebanon and encouraging the support base of each campaign strategy to mobilize also for all of KAFA's campaigns, KAFA will continue to grow national momentum. This momentum will be critical in KAFA's appeal to the government and the Lebanese people to prioritize reforming gender-based rights to protect both women and children while also acting as a tool to destabilize larger systems

of violence. In addition to this discussion, this thesis presents the multitude of reactions to KAFA's strategies, illustrating how KAFA's work influences the public while the public's responses simultaneously influence how KAFA appeals for activist support.

Chapter 1: Methods, Literature Review, and Theory

METHODS:

In order to address this topic adequately, I will utilize a single, embedded case-study methodology to analyze the organization KAFA. I will use KAFA's website and social media use to investigate their outreach strategies, evaluating their primary documentary and video materials in Arabic and English. This analysis will lead to obtaining sample responses from social media users reacting to KAFA's campaigns. Televised media, online media resources, and blogs inform and guide this research. Additionally, this project utilizes an interview with a key informant, the Communication Director of KAFA since 2009, Maya Ammar, in order to shape and constrain the analysis. This interview grounds the study in a realistic and accurate context.

KAFA's visual material, specifically photographs, documents, and videos, will be key to this thesis. I will also incorporate videos from other sources, including key YouTube videos that document specific cases that my analysis references. These, as well as journalistic and blog accounts, will be helpful in garnering wider feedback from the Lebanese public. Other outlets, such as television stations, have shown KAFA's videos. I will look at the different responses to these videos depending on the source of their exposure. I will also utilize specific cases of violence that sparked a remarkable response within Lebanon (as well as internationally). These cases, in addition to bearing witness, will ground the research in real instances of violence to give these women back their subjectivity and illustrate the progression of KAFA's creation, campaigns, and outlook.

This thesis utilizes an interview with an informant from KAFA to guide the thesis while serving as a point of comparison for assertions. The interview helps to contextualize the aforementioned visual material and explains intention and internal decision-making progress within the organization for several of KAFA's campaigns. The following discussion summarizes my conversation with Maya Ammar, the Communications Director for the women's rights organization KAFA, conducted on January 7, 2015 that I will use to inform all aspects of this thesis:

Maya is a Lebanese citizen, holding a Master's Degree in Communication from St. Joseph University. Though Maya is from Lebanon, she preferred not to state her confessional group. This appeared to be an active attempt to promote the secular identity of the KAFA organization. Our interview covered a wide range of topics, focusing on KAFA's campaigns in particular as well as the identity of KAFA members. Beginning our discussion with the personal status laws in Lebanon, Maya noted that, "As long as personal status laws are confessional and religious, discrimination against women will not stop." In addition to patriarchal messages embedded in the religious themselves, the differing laws between confessional groups also discriminate against and among women, keeping women perpetually in a subordinate state to men. In 2014, Parliament passed Law 293 protecting women and children from domestic violence. Yet this Law was heavily amended, prompting protests against the changes. Maya said that for the priorities for the year 2015, she would like to see an increased implementation of the good clauses within the law, as well as continued advocacy to introduce the necessary Amendments to the Law. When I asked her why she thinks it is that these laws have yet to be changed in

Lebanon she said that, “No one ever really tried to address the issue in a big campaign with a very clear plan.” According to her, it is extremely difficult to even know where to begin to address the problem. She noted that attempting to address the problem could make a person “feel paralyzed [because} who are you addressing? Who are you talking to? The State? Where is the State?” Here, Maya introduces one of the fundamental problems with political change in Lebanon: the government is itself precariously balanced between secular and religious pulls, confessional groups vying for power, and outside state influences. As of March 25, 2015, Lebanon has been without a President since May 25, 2014, a fact that continually makes political progress in Lebanon difficult to pursue.

Additionally, one of the biggest problems KAFA faces is inspiring people to care about women’s rights issues. Violence against women has never been a priority in Lebanon, but KAFA increasingly makes it difficult to ignore. Maya says the organization does this through showing the parents and names of those killed by domestic violence in the news. Media has been an incredible help to spreading information regarding gender-based violence in addition to KAFA’s use of social media and campaigning outreach. Maya, who conducts all communication outreach with the help of others, believes the organization’s campaign strategies and outreach tactics are indeed effective. If nothing else, the posts on social media and news media open the door for debate. She noted that most comments on KAFA’s various media mediums are left to inspire such debate and discussion, although KAFA does remove comments from media such as Facebook if the comments are deemed threatening or use bad language. Maya indicated that though

KAFA does not have the resources to conduct extensive media research, the group notices significant increases in calls to the helpline following a commercial campaign. Interestingly, Maya would say that currently there is not a women's movement in Lebanon, or that it is very, very weak.[19] Despite no formal women's movement, KAFA does work in collaboration with other women's groups in Lebanon. For example, when trying to pass Law 293, a law protecting women and children from domestic violence, there was a national coalition of 64 groups, with many of them representing women's groups. She said that though some of these groups do a lot of work for women's rights, many exist in name only. KAFA's organization is growing, however, with 600 predominantly young people wanting to volunteer in 2014. This was particularly interesting to note that 53% of KAFA's Facebook followers were between the ages of 18-25. Though KAFA recognizes the need to grow its organization, it currently does not have the resources to do so.

I was able to discuss a few of KAFA's campaigns with Maya, including the Name and Shame Campaign, the Very Disturbing Taxi Ride, as well as efforts directed at men and KAFA's work with migrant domestic workers' abuses. In regards to the Very Disturbing Taxi Ride, a video showing women directly confronted with verbal abuse, I asked Maya if the group intentionally used spectacle in its campaigns. Maya said that overall, the group attempts to avoid pictures of battered women in order to challenge the preconception that abuse is always physical or visible. Additionally, she stated that they

[19] Here, the phrase women's movement indicates the widespread organizing of a group of people with set goals for reforming current policies pertaining to the treatment and protection of women in order to institute systems that will rectify unequal social conditions.

didn't want to show graphic images of women, partially because many viewers don't want to see disturbing imagery. Instead, KAFA attempts to send quick messages that will stick in viewers' minds. A great example illustrating KAFA's emphasis on awareness for multiple forms of abuse in an impactful message is its "Words Hurt" Campaign:[20]

Figure: 1.1

In the case of the taxi ride, it was a social experiment to challenge women to react to witnessing domestic violence. She noted that in some cases, people say, "Oh my God, they hear her scream, but they did nothing." KAFA wanted to find out whether women would react if confronted with verbal abuse.

In regards to the Name and Shame Campaign, a campaign aimed at publicly shaming Ministers of Parliament who were amending Law 293, Maya confirmed that

[20] Green, "Here's What Domestic Violence Ads Look Like In The Middle East."

according to an inside source the organization had at one of the TV stations, a Minister of Parliament did indeed call the station to have the name and Shame advertisement removed. The same MP's supporters also went to one of the buses where the ad was posted and tore the ad down. The point of this campaign was to get people to ask, who is this Committee that is making the changes to Law 293? The organization wanted to reinforce a culture of accountability where the people monitor their elected officials.

Maya also discussed KAFA's attempts to include men in its organization, a process that really began in 2009. The belief for including males is that they not only should care about equality for everyone, but that when equality comes for women, the relationships between males and females will change. KAFA's attempts to involve men, including several male-led forums in 2 or 3 towns, had limited affects. Most men would say they support women's rights in theory, but then they leave the discussion when questions are asked regarding ideas of consent, personal status laws, the definition of domestic violence, etc.

My discussion with Maya detailed KAFA's religious, socio-economic and organizational structure. First and foremost, KAFA identifies as a secular organization in order to provide a common meeting ground for women of all confessional backgrounds. KAFA believes in being part of the civil state, where all referents for equality come not from religious texts but from human rights charters.

Although KAFA realizes the necessity for including women of all classes and forbids classism within the organization, Maya notes that the unfortunate reality that women from lower socio-economic classes often are not afforded the chance to

participate in this group. The majority of the participants are from middle-class backgrounds, with fewer participants from a wealthier socio-economic level. Historically, many women from wealthier backgrounds were the most likely to re-produce patriarchal structures on poorer or migrant women, something that Maya says KAFA will not allow for presently. Maya stated that those who are bourgeoisie and only want rights for Lebanese women and not everyone could not be part of KAFA. Additionally, women who view work in a national government organization or an organization advocating for human rights as only a job would not be able to persevere in this line of work. Those working for KAFA must act out their beliefs for equality both inside and outside the workplace.

KAFA possesses a semi-horizontal group structure with a board and heads of units in charge over other women. There are no elections, and the director of KAFA only makes sure that each unit is effectively working toward the larger group goal. As noted, many of KAFA's employees tend to be from the middle class and tend to have some degree of higher education. Maya believes that in addition to poorer women not having time to work or volunteer in an organization for women's rights, these same women are less likely to be able to participate because of the increased specialization of human rights organizations. As these movements begin to build and grow, groups within each organization, and even whole organizations, begin to take on more specialized tasks to be most effective. Whereas some of the groups handle legal issues, other groups handle research or communication aspects of human rights or women's rights. Despite this specialization, Maya emphasized KAFA's need to join hands with women from all

different backgrounds, including working with other women's rights and migrant domestic worker's rights organizations on commonly agreed upon issues.

Discussing the sponsorship system, Maya advocated for complete dismantling of the Kafala System. In this foreseeable situation, the employers would still pay for a migrant domestic worker to travel to Lebanon, but the employee would have the opportunity to leave the employer at any point. This would make it easier for the worker to break a contract and escape a poor situation, something that could be achieved through migrant domestic workers gaining protection under Lebanese Labor Laws. Additionally, Maya said the government must increase its monitoring of the recruitment agencies, as most are human traffickers. Removing the Kafala system from Lebanon would also remove the possibility for apologists to make any excuses for it. Those that assert the system equally hurts the employer and employee would no longer be able to make this claim if migrant domestic workers had basic and equal employment rights in Lebanon. As Maya said in our interview, hiring a migrant domestic worker is not a basic right; human rights, however, certainly is.

It cannot be overstated how helpful was my interview, and follow-up questions, with Maya Ammar, for this thesis. Her answers grounded the research, providing a stricter methodology for research questions and analysis. The interview and questions both informed my own research, while providing a trustworthy source with which to measure all other primary and secondary sources. Additionally, the interview partially filled in for the nearly non-existent literature on women's organizations in Lebanon. Despite this noticeable gap, I utilized a wide breadth of other literature to provide

background information and theoretical depth to my thesis. The current literature reviewed here mainly addresses topics of gender, resistance, and nationalism, but neglects to recognize the importance of women's rights and the organizations that are pushing for equality and freedom from violence for all women in Lebanon.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on the field of women's rights in the Middle East is growing, taking shape through a variety of methods and topics of interest. Much of the current literature focuses on countries that have experienced uprisings and protests in recent years, what some referred to as the "Arab Spring," or their "Arab Uprisings." In particular, many academics are still uncertain of the extent of development of women's rights and civil involvement before, during, and after these events. This literature review will instead focus on particular conditions and campaigns that set the foundation for a women's movement. I will draw comparisons between women's movements and experiences during the aforementioned "Arab Uprisings" and the current situation in Lebanon, while also placing the growing organizing of Lebanese women into a longer historical Lebanese context. The goal of the review is to ground a proposal around the group KAFA, which I will do through discussions of gender, nationalism, and resistance. In order to complete a thorough summary of the current literature on these topics, I have broken them down further into sub-categories. I describe gender in terms of class, structure, and motherhood, nationalism in terms of citizenship and conflict/violence/war, and resistance in terms of resistance in Lebanon and resistance outside Lebanon. By breaking the topic of

performance of women's rights and ideas of bodily subjectivity down into these themes, I will be constructing a full framework of ideas and broadly contextualizing the interactions between women's groups and the public sphere, illustrating the dissemination of information and the corresponding mobilization of these women's movements. I hope to use this format in order to deconstruct barriers between this women's resistance group and the normative societal interactions and beliefs that surround it.

Gender-based problems for Females:

Addressing the topic of gender is of utmost importance in a study of a female-led group primarily seeking to support women across Lebanon. In order to address this particular topic as it pertains to KAFA and performances of agency, this section will expound upon conceptions of gender through three sub-categories: class, motherhood, and state structures. My intention is to illustrate conversations on constricting gender rights by outside forces, constricting gender rights by inside forces, and the internalization of control mechanisms.

Class conflict between women in the Middle East reflects the internalization and reproduction of patriarchal controls. Elite Middle Eastern women often benefit from patriarchal structures of society in their political or social control over lower classes of women through male kinship ties. While this does not imply that women have individual authority or subjectivity in their actions, it does indicate that certain classes of women suffer more than others. In *Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon*, Jureidini

and Moukarbel note that the primary abuser of domestic workers in Lebanon is the "Madame."[21] Far from these elite women uniting with migrant labor workers to gain rights and protection for women, they instead mentally and physically abuse and entrap the workers from leaving their home. Though these relationships are very much tied up with forms of racism and Lebanese nationalism, class control representing patriarchal domination also prevails in politics.

Patriarchy is also acted out through women's participation in political roles, whether it is their entrance into politics through a male kinship tie or representing the male leaders of sectarian groups in women's group discussions. As Suad Joseph notes in her article "Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East," women's right groups are circumscribed by conflicting narratives within the state that reflect the group's own variance of views and needs depending on social status. Though women are seen as a monolithic group by the state, they are embedded in multiple social structures, with particular allegiances to different kin and familial circles. Again in Suad's article, Women's NGOs are frequently tied to political parties, thus catering to particular sects or social classes. Loyalties to a particular tribe or sectarian group have led women's groups to shy away from the political as Lina Khatib notes in *Gender, Citizenship, and Political Agency in Lebanon*. They view women's issues as relegated to private space, thereby constructing a strict boundary between indoor discussions and outside representations. Additionally, women working within the political system are often bound to patriarchal loyalties that secured them their position in government following either the death of a

[21] Jureidini and Moukarbel, "Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon." pg. 585

husband or father (Hariri), or functioning as a temporary stand in for a husband in prison (Geagea). As a result, their first consideration is how to further party goals and maintain conditions for elite class prosperity.

While these conflicts continue to keep the elite women in a place of hierarchy over other women, they also disrupt resistance structures. Evelyn Accad brings up in her chapter *Sexuality and Sexual Politics* the history of these Lebanese Political loyalties when discussing women's groups in 1975 in her discussion on Yolla Polity-Charara's analysis. In an attempt by leftist groups to come together to move forward a united feminist ideology, women from, "the Phalangist party, the national bloc, the Progressive Socialist party, the Ba'ath party, an the Communist party, as well as others from smaller groups" gathered together to discuss ideology (243). Yet instead of forming a united front, these women instead became suspicious of the goals of women from other groups, allowing their political loyalties to trump feminist goals and preventing them from having honest conversation on issues within each group. In *Between Resistance and Compliance, Feminism and Nationalism: Women in Black in Israel*, Erella Shami discusses the elite nature and unintended hierarchal structure of an Israeli women's resistance group working for an end to the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories. The structure of this group resulted in the elevation of more educated and higher social class women, with the simultaneous silencing and exclusion of lower classes of women. Similar to the stagnation of Lebanese women's rights in 1975, the Israeli women's group ultimately disbanded in part due to its elitist structure.

There is the danger in every women's group of falling prey to elitist and classist exercises of power over the already disenfranchised. In particular, women's political involvement often indicates a wider influence, usually related to kinship, of the group that put the woman or women in power. These political influences are replicated in private situations as well, with madams abusing migrant workers. Issues of political ties and hierarchal structures must be taken into account in discussion of any women's group in order to avoid falling prey to the class issues experienced by the Women in Black. Current literature on the involvement of women in women's rights focuses on the few women in politics and the a-political nature of some women's groups. My research will focus on KAFA in large part because of its claim to be a non-confessional[22] and non-political group, thus partially releasing possible political and elitist influence over the group's ideology and activist aims.

In order to understand gender performance within a given system, it is necessary to situate it within the particular structures that control its limitations. In the Middle East in general, and Lebanon in particular, women's rights sit at the intersection of economic, legal, and religious structures that dictate the extent to which these rights may be publically or privately acted out. Current literature on the topic presents the dominant problem within women's rights and safety to be constricted by personal status laws in Lebanon. Women face limitations in regards to citizenship, divorce proceedings, and child custody laws. Suad Joseph illustrates the consequences of personal status laws

[22] KAFA's description as a non-confessional group reflects their desire to represent all women in a secular manner, without loyalty to a particular sectarian identity.

being under the control of each confessional division instead of the government, with decisions that determine a women's welfare depending on religious constraints. Lebanon does not have secular laws to protect women from abuse and assist them in economic hardships, thereby increasing the reliance of women upon their social community, and especially the men within that community. There is a close relation between the legal structures that do not exist and the religious politics within the state. Because the confessional nature of the political system depends on kinship relations, political actors are very hesitant to challenge religious authority.

Often entering into this conversation on women in resistance is the topic of motherhood as relates to familial and religious structures within a state. Zeina Zataari in *The Culture of Motherhood* centers her conversation on motherhood as a form of resistance in Southern Lebanon utilizing Josephs' writings to place family at the center of resistance. While it is necessary to read religion into all discussion in Lebanon in light of the confessional nature of the state, these discussions must acknowledge the limitations of religion and motherhood for feminism but still maintain an understanding of local observances. The focus of religious restrictions for women's movements is first and foremost the division between secular laws and religious laws. Moving forward a religiously influenced ideology for women's rights polarizes women of other religious sects. This, however, does not mean that secular and religious feminists movements cannot move forward together. As illustrated in both Zataari's article as well as in Tami Amanda Jacob's article *Feminism, nationalism, and difference - Reflections on the Palestinian Women's Movement*, it is often essential to the religious participant to

alleviate religious prohibitions on women's movements to legitimize the movement in the eyes of the local community. These discussions bring up the question of how women can implement their rights without the support of the community. There are possibilities within religious literature, primarily focusing on Islamic literature due to the close connection between government and religion, for women to utilize for attaining rights. Yet even though there is the possibility for gender freedom, secular feminism finds its departure from Islamic feminism in the understanding that equality for women does not mean men and women have access to the same societal roles, but that they have complementary roles.

The culture of motherhood in the Middle East is relevant to all studies on gender, and of particular importance to a study on KAFA, a women's resistance group. The conversation on motherhood either presents the topic as a redemptive format for women in Lebanon, or as a symbol of purity and nationality. This research is illuminating yet it lacks commentary on the destructive ramifications of inherently connecting motherhood and purity to communal value. To connect these topics implies that the woman who is not a mother or who does not fit into normative sexual practices has less value than a woman bearing traditional nationalist markers. My research will reframe this argument through positing the woman as subject, not an object that gains value through performing social norms. I will also bring in issues of religion and secularism as relates to motherhood, continuing Zaatari's discussion but departing from it to break apart the binary structure that she uses in her research. Lastly, it will be important to analyze the confrontation between KAFA and conceptions of nationalism, especially in regards to who is able to

perform nationalism and what happens when woman from different nationalist communities challenge one state.

Though the literature on state structures paints secular and religious feminism as a distinct binary system, I would argue that it is necessary to put these two movements in conversation with each other. There exists the possibility for the two to mutually construct the other through realizing the necessity of achieving success in the religious realm to have success in the secular realm, and vice versa. Especially within the state of Lebanon where religion and secularism are different actors in one system, these two avenues must cohabitate. KAFA is a non-confessional movement, yet it is necessarily made up of women from confessions. These confessions are part of the identity of the women who make up the women's group and cannot be wholly set aside.

Nationalism:

Many Western feminists disregard the possibility of nationalism aiding women's rights in the Middle East, as well as its role in restricting or aiding gender equality. Middle Eastern and subaltern feminists challenge western feminism and advocate for research that incorporates nationalist struggles into feminist resistance. In order to adequately account for nationalism, this section will focus on ideas of citizenship, conflicts and violence, and motherhood. The final category, motherhood, could also fit into the section on gender, yet it is integrally tied to nationalism within the Middle Eastern context.

Research on citizenship in the Middle East focuses on the institutionalization of gender inequalities, while also raising the question of what it means to belong to a state.

In Lebanon, citizenship is considered to be gender neutral and promoting equality between men and women. Despite these idealistic perceptions, women do not have access to identical claims to citizenship as men, partly due to the inherently masculine and western concept of a citizen. The idea of citizen is bound up with the creation of the nation state, and is defined as one who is able to enter into a contract as a result of land-ownership. During the rise of the nation state, the people who owned land were primarily white elite males. Suad Joseph has written a considerable amount on the topic of gender and citizenship, especially in Lebanon, and she discusses how the inherently gendered nature of the word citizenship reflects the institutionalized sexism of the state's practices. In Joseph's article on *Civic Myths, Citizenship, and Gender in Lebanon* she notes that feminist critique of the Lebanese state must move past the westernized construction of citizenship to reveal the underlying kinship structure that further institutionalizes notions of the citizen. Disregarding current conceptions of its failure being due to Christian and Muslim rivalries throughout history, she instead claims it is a result of the family being the primary unit in Lebanon, and the reliance on familial connections for social welfare needs. Joseph discusses the primacy of kinships and political familialism in regards to social life and policies.

Mounira Charrad works on similar topics in *Becoming a Citizen: Lineage versus Individual in Tunisia and Morocco*, comparing citizenship and gender in Morocco and Tunisia while also focusing on the relation of kinship to women's rights. The level that kinship influences the political spheres in these two countries directly correlates to the extent of women's freedoms and rights. This is evident as well in Lina Khatib's work on

citizenship in Lebanon when she explores women's access to certain civil freedoms, but discrimination becoming evident in personal status law and the low level of participation of women in government. Tying back to kinship and familial relationships, women are less likely to participate in government because of the patriarchal and patrilineal traditions within the state that trades favors with other political and religious leadership. Women often enter the political sphere as a replacement for their brothers, husbands, or fathers, as was the case with Solange Gamayel and Samir Geagea.

Research on Middle Eastern citizenship focuses on its relationship to the powerful structure of kinship. Mounira Charrad's research is particularly useful when she constructs a method for comparing women's rights in Tunisia and Morocco through analyzing the impact of kinship in each state. Through pairing this research with the work of Suad Joseph and Lina Khatib, I hope to implement Charrad's method into my work on Lebanon and KAFA, moving the research from general citizenship restrictions to understanding issues of religion, language, and spatial placement in conferring citizenship rights. Additionally, political power is intimately tied to kinship relations and it would be useful to explore the relationship between KAFA and politicians, as well as the ways in which these relationships have affected KAFA's outreach.

Subaltern feminists challenge western feminists' critique of nationalism, stating that nationalism can be a tool for women's rights. It is necessary to account for the ways in which feminism takes shape through nationalism in Lebanon and the wider Middle Eastern region, yet the restrictions that nationalist aims place upon the development of women's movements cannot be ignored. In *The Case for Lebanon* Hala Maksoud

discusses previous literature by Frantz Fanon stating that women find liberation during wartime, liberating themselves, males from chauvinism, as well as their oppressors from oppressing. Contrary to this point, Maksoud illustrates that more often than not, women's rights might be furthered for a time during liberation wars and immediately following, yet they tend to regress to previous norms soon after the war ends. Fanon's claims are likely based upon the perception that women's entrance into the workforce or public sphere is a women's rights victory that will lead to women gaining more freedom. Contrary to this point, these suppositions do not fit with the data and realities in Middle Eastern countries following periods of conflict. Maksoud expands upon this idea when she discusses the return to traditions in Lebanese homes and communities during the 15-year long civil war. Women may expand their responsibilities into masculine spheres during periods of conflict, but this growth is not lasting and it may upset traditional spheres of masculinity. As Maksoud notes, there is the problem of understanding these wartime activities as benefiting women's rights, but there is also the question of whether the women's actions intend to promote feminism in the first place.

Both Lina Khatib in *Gender, Citizenship and Political Agency* and Evelyn Accad in *Sexuality and Sexual Politics* note that during times of war or negative peace, women's concerns become subservient to the notion of survival. Women focus on working or obtaining provisions not for women's rights, but in order to keep their family alive. For women to focus on their rights during times of conflict could is at times conceived of a betrayal of the larger nationalist cause. Jacoby reflects on this point in her article on Palestinian nationalism when she considers the necessity of community unity when the

community stands in opposition to a threat. Especially in the Palestinian context, personal sacrifice for the existential promise of the larger group is a paramount concern. Palestinian women do resist against gendered limitations, as well as take on traditionally masculine forms of resistance, but outright resistance and condemnation against Palestinian norms could be seen as divisive and subversive to the larger cause. Unfortunately, Jacoby also notes that Palestinian women's ultimate dedication to the Palestinian nationalist cause at times results in domestic abuse going unreported. Loyalty to dominant men in a woman's community or nationalist group is not limited to Palestine, as Accad's reveals in her research on Lebanon. During the Lebanese Civil War, women came together from varying confessions to move forward an idea of feminism. What resulted was intense separation between the political enemies and a refusal to criticize men from their own political group. The women were hesitant to discuss personal issues with women of other groups, likely coming from a fear of weakening their own sectarian position or reprisal from the dominant men in their lives.

The research on women's rights within nationalist frameworks illustrates the problems women face in remaining loyal to their community while not compromising feminist goals. The majority of research on this topic focuses on women's rights during times of active war and ongoing political violence, neglecting analysis on times of negative peace. Through situating KAFA within the current situation of negative peace in Lebanon, I will emphasize the unique barriers the group must overcome in order to convince the wider public of the urgency of women's rights. Additionally, Accad's research opens up the possibility to circumvent accusations of divisiveness. Her

redemptive narrative of self-love and the primacy of sexuality even during times of conflict aspires to ultimately deter war and violence, and could form an interesting framework to analyze KAFA's public appeals.

Though not limited to the Middle East, Middle Eastern motherhood is intimately tied to ideas of state boundaries and nationalist identities. Motherhood is universal by its very nature, but also serves as a very distinct cultural marker dependent on local customs and performance. Women bodies are objectified as sites of reproduction, bringing forth the warriors that defend the nation and the citizens that populate it. Women are the boundaries between their nation and the other, leading to an emphasis placed upon female purity, both to protect the endurance of a nation and to bring honor to the community. Middle Eastern communities often elevate the role of the mother, an idea that Zeina Zaatari utilizes as a redemptive framework for women's resistance in South Lebanon. *In The Culture of Motherhood: An Avenue for Women's Civil Participation in South Lebanon*, she invokes Suad's work on citizenship to glorify women in their making of the state and its citizens. She breaks down the participation of women and motherhood to a binary structure of religious women and secular women, making space for the religious mother in civil participation. Glorifying the role of the mother within a nation may bring high respect to a woman, but this concept is problematized when women are only valued for their role as reproducers. The objectification of women as wombs or reproductive sites places a high value on purity. Consequently, when the woman is no longer pure, she no longer has the same worth. These ideas are surely not limited to the Middle Eastern context, but prevail around the world.

Ideas of purity and female honor are brought to attention when they are linked to systems of violence, especially rape culture. In the study *Beliefs about Wife Beating: An Exploratory Study with Lebanese Students*, the views of the students in Lebanon were actually less traditional toward the roles of women than in other Arab communities, but ideas of honor and family cohesion remained extremely important in informing their ideas of community and purity standards. More specifically, when the students were confronted with questions regarding whether a women who was sexually unfaithful to her husband deserved to be beaten, a significant number of students justified the beatings. In other parts of the study, students were less sympathetic to women who were considered promiscuous and toward divorced women when they were the victims in hypothetical situations of rape. Societies' less sympathetic views towards victims of sexual violence turns into hostile reactions when women's bodies are used to challenge systems of oppression. In the article on Women in Black, Israeli women who confronted the Israeli occupation were often harassed, threatened with violence and sexist comments. These women were perceived as betraying their state and nationalism, using their bodies that bore the nation in their wombs as subjects of resistance.

Resistance:

There is very little scholarship on Lebanese Women's Resistance, with much focus remaining on philosophizing the current state women's rights in the state. This review will also focus on these issues as well, primarily in the sections addressing issues of structure and citizenship, yet it is important to move beyond the structure to understand

the current situation of resistance on the ground. Currently, many academics choose to address women's rights through focusing on women's issues, such as domestic violence and sex worker abuse. Forms of resistance are referred to in discussion of these issues, but they rarely exist as the focus. The lack of discussion on women's resistance in Lebanon is not entirely due to the lack of interest, but instead is a result of women's groups acting as an arm of the state. They consistently fail to set aside confessional politics while also reinforcing patriarchal structures through elitism. Female resistance exists in alternative forms, with education being an important part of the movement. Cheryl Toman notes in *The Link Between Women's Studies Programs and Grassroots Organizations in Lebanon, the Balkans, and the Palestinian Territories: A Comparative Study* that the women's studies program at Lebanese American University was founded right before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1973 and influenced the formation of other women's rights groups. Most notably, The Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against Women (LECORVAW) was founded in 1997 as a response to the increase in domestic violence incidents. Breaking with many women's groups' strict division between political and private issues, LECORVAW pushed forward a political agenda while also educating the high school generation.

On the other side of female resistance, female domestic workers participate in what Amrita Pande calls "meso-level" resistance through balcony talk in *From "Balcony Talk" and "Practical Prayers" to Illegal Collectives Migrant Domestic Workers and Meso-Level Resistances in Lebanon*. Perhaps the best example of female resistance in Lebanon, these women engage in behavior that undermines the current oppressive system

while still maintaining a structure that advocates female-led legal and community protection. This particular structure stands as a unique example of what women's community groups could look like without designated patriarchal domination. Though women's leadership in women's rights groups and resistance is an integral part of the movement, Rita Stephan puts forward the possibility of men and family having a part in the struggle in *Couple's activism in Lebanon- The legacy of Laure Moghaizel*. She uses Laure Moghaizel's marriage and partnership with her husband Joseph to illustrate ideas of "family feminism", an opposing form to western feminism, which Stephan sees as individualistic and lacking a Middle Eastern core.

These three forms of resistance stand alone as interesting prospects in surveying current literature, yet their problem lies in that very notion: these struggles stand alone, failing to connect those resisting violence to those resisting against the perpetrators of violence to the very familial structure that allows violence to exist. Toman's article on women's Rights academic programs and women's rights groups does not explicitly draw connections between the two, leaving the research with a large gap in information. Pande's research on migrant worker resistance is perhaps the best example for resistance in Lebanon, yet it does not connect the disenfranchised women to Lebanese women who have the possibility to construct legal frameworks. Stephan also fails to adequately describe female relations to males in resistance movements. She propagates second wave western feminism as the dominant feminism, constructing feminism as a movement without a place for men. Failure to connect these different structures misses the necessary interactions to build up a successful women's rights movement. My research will

explicitly connect the different aspects and actors of resistance, illustrating the potential for egalitarian activism in terms of class, race, and gender. Moreover, there is no current research that extensively traces the network of resistance that effect subjectivity on the parts of all participants of a women's rights movement like KAFA.

Resistance movements are prevalent across the world, varying in form and size, yet firmly situated in the changing history of women's rights. With research on women's resistance from other areas in the Middle East is steadily increasing in the period following the Western-deemed "Arab Spring," it is necessarily to situate Lebanese Women's Resistance within this growing conversation. The Palestinian women's resistance movements have special relevance to the Lebanese context, as the two groups have historically been intertwined through Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. Moreover, Lebanese women and Palestinian women experience differing forms of feminist subjugation, yet similarly don't have outright access to governmental structures to change current laws. Lebanese women work under against a government that hesitates to implement women's personal status rights due to relations to varying religious authorities, and Palestinian women are unable to even access the Israeli government ruling over them in occupation. Toman's article makes this very point as she draws a comparative study of women's rights programs and local women's rights groups between Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and the Balkans. In all three areas, the women's programs and movements were formed out of a need to educate women, both upon their reentrance into society after periods of intense physical and emotional violence, and as a means to further women's rights.

Domestic Violence is often underreported or altogether ignored during times of conflict. Especially during the drawn-out and on-going violence in regards to the Palestinian context, it is imperative for women to have options available to seek safety or reprieve from violence within the home. In *Palestinian Women from Femina Sacra to agents of Active Resistance*, Ronit Lentin also comments on Palestinian women's silence on domestic violence as another form of resistance to Israeli control. Palestinian women may be resisting the occupier by appearances of unity with Palestinian males, regardless of abuse, but they also take active roles of resistance against Israeli occupation. Their resistance includes gender resistance, but tends to become embedded within the larger Palestinian resistance. Palestinian women resist through every day actions, like wearing their clothes to bed to resist house demolitions or continuing to take their children to school, but they also partake in larger resistance activities through armed resistance. Circumstantially restricted, Palestinian women navigate women's rights through participating in masculine regimented resistance. Though these forms of female resistance are perhaps limited due to structure, the women utilize available avenues for female empowerment by navigating through culturally available means.

Bedouin Arab women in Israel face similar constraints through both their double minority status as Bedouins and then again as women. In *The Activism of Bedouin Women*, Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder notes that without outside governmental structures to appeal to for a legal framework, Bedouin women are relegated to resistance that functions within the Bedouin patriarchal system. One form of resistance is through women creating goods for sale, which in turn brings money into their households while also benefiting the

local community. The women stay within traditional boundaries by remaining within the private sphere of the village, yet build up personal status for women through economic ventures. These women are also able to create economic and educational opportunities through acting in designated female spaces. Similar to the creation of women's programs in Universities or the creation of women's groups, the Bedouin women work and teach in women-only environments. While these activities are still limited because of the women's needs to navigate traditional gender structures, their activities build a foundation for future women to use their education and economic success to create a space for women's rights. Women's resistance in Israel extends to the Israeli women, specifically a group that was known as The Women in Black. In *Between Resistance and Compliance, Feminism and Nationalism: Women in Black in Israel* Erella Shadmi discusses how their resistance for the Palestinian people placed them in direct odds with the Israeli state and public. Yet whereas the Bedouin and Palestinian women resistance was forced to work within masculine-dominated structures to create future resistance opportunities, the Women in Black instead operated outside the patriarchal structures. They utilized their Israeli bodies to move into the public and traditionally masculine space, while confronting this space through using their bodies designed to produce Israeli warriors to instead protest the warriors' violence.

The literature on resistance movements outside of Lebanon considers placement and space that governs the movement of the women actors. This is extremely important, especially for a Western woman writing about a Middle Eastern women's resistance group. Though these limitations are important to consider, my research will find its

departure from these studies through acknowledging specific restrictions upon women within their religious and state communities, yet particularly focusing on ways in which these restrictions are navigated outside the patriarchal system. KAFA participates within the Lebanese state system, yet it does not become a part of it.

Conceptions of space are of immediate importance to themes of resistance. Not only limited to a Middle Eastern context, space is divided to give areas specific purpose, creating order and meaning. The history of colonialism is rife with examples of westernized influence reordering Middle Eastern home and city space. Communal and national identity markers are also inscribed into the space and act as signals for who is permitted in the space, and the rules that govern it. Middle Eastern countries, and here Lebanon in particular, divide space in many different, and often overlapping, ways; the literature will focus on three distinct divisions: gender, religion, and class.

Lebanon is a country split between its Eastern and Western identities, yet these identities rarely exist as strictly separate entities, and they clash just as often as they peacefully coincide. Religion is a prime example of a tension between Eastern and Western traditions. Though the state claims to have a westernized and democratic government, the religious makeup of Lebanon challenges these secular claims and puts forth more traditional demands and structures. Cities in Lebanon are evidence of religious division of space, with the Lebanese Civil War deepening divides and reinforcing city lines. Within each respective confessional town or city, the community members partake in the norms of the specific place. For example, Fatima Mernissi in *The Meaning of Spatial Boundaries* discusses Islamic gendering of space that constructs the public sphere

as belonging to men and the home life as a place for women. Notably, the home life is for women, but it is still ruled by men. As home family life is the realm of the women, so too do they serve as sexual boundaries for the family. This idea is reinforced when women enter into the public sphere, having to wear veils in certain communities to cover up their status as intruder. Suad Joseph also challenges these secular and religious/ western and eastern divisions of physical or figurative space in her discussion on citizenship. Though religious practices divide physical boundaries in space, they also break the public and private barrier. Citizenship in Lebanon comes from a Western context, and its attempts at separating the private sphere from the public are undermined due to the kin-based nature of the society. This exemplifies women's difficulties in breaching public space as it is still intimately tied to the religious, mirroring the political sphere's connections to religious authorities.

Women bringing family matters into public space, as opposed to men instituting kinship ties, is in itself a form of resistance. One group that breaks spatial taboos is Heya TV, a Lebanese television station that Dina Matar discusses in *Heya TV: A Feminist Counterpublic for Women?* They first challenge the public and private space through discussing taboo topics, such as homosexuality or abortion, on a Lebanese (rather than Western) channel. Next, they take questions from the street, effectively breaking barriers down between the masses and the TV anchors while also connecting the public space to the private viewing space in the viewer's home. Whereas Heya TV is currently a legal venue for resistance, Amrita Pande discusses migrant workers' borderline to outright illegal spatial resistance. The women workers take over the balconies in their residences

and use them as a type of "meso-resistance," resistance existing neither fully in public nor in private, but as a bridge between both arenas. Meso-resistance is often the first step for women to create networks of support and seek further advice from other migrant women workers. These women resist in other ways as well, from fleeing abusive work places and entering illegal Lebanese space without a visa, to forming women's communities to give legal advice and provide protection.

The literature on spatial resistance provides a helpful starting point for understanding current roles men and women, religion, and legality play in navigating public and private spheres in Lebanon. After connecting these literatures, it is apparent that this research does not directly address ways that women's groups place themselves in public places as a way to assert exist and perform agency. KAFA physically moves into the public and traditionally masculine space with a feminist and traditionally private message. Pushing this conversation further, it would be useful to examine arrest policies for KAFA's resistance, and the women's legal rights post-arrest compared to migrant workers illegally moving through the streets.

This literature review focused on the fundamental concepts relating women's rights to KAFA, specifically gender, nationalism, and resistance. These categories were broken down into further sub-categories in order to illustrate a more in-depth analysis of current situations in Lebanon and the wider Middle Eastern region. Current literature on the topic varies, but often focuses on ideas of women's citizenship and personal status laws, women's resistance situated within familial or traditional gendered roles, and resistance during times of extended conflicts and war. There is very little literature on

female resistance in Lebanon in general, with only one article in this review focusing on a particular Lebanese women's group (LECORVAW). I will begin my research at this point, attempting to answer the bigger questions of who is organizing and resisting for women and domestic workers' rights in Lebanon. My research will target certain areas within this context to bridge gaps in literature while also continuing conversations with academics such as Suad Joseph and Mounira Charrad.

I will situation my research within the situation of negative peace in Lebanon, as this particular construct is currently unaccounted for, and will address the following concepts: binary breakdowns and webs of connection, extensive legal research, and resistance groups and forms of communication and visual culture. The first concept addresses the need within resistance research to position activist groups within a wider social construct and connect them to other forms of resistance. It also calls the breakdown of current secular and religious binary social systems within women's rights in order to understand KAFA's non-confessional stance made up of women from all backgrounds. The second concept takes into account the extensive literature written on citizenship and puts them in conversation to look more deeply into the relationship between language, gender, and space and citizenship rights. It will also address questions of legality surrounding KAFA's performances and resistance, placing it against the often-illegal resistance of migrant workers. Finally, information on resistance groups tends to account for structural makeup, ideology, and resistance practices, but it neglects how the group communicates with the public. Through reading KAFA against the article on Heya TV, I will analyze the visual culture and communication used by the group to break boundaries

between group members and the wider public, as well as KAFA's interactions with government officials. These concepts will aid my larger research question of how KAFA performs agency and enacts bodily subjectivity within the Lebanese state, and what these issues entail for gender equality in the greater Middle Eastern region.

CONCLUSION:

Despite the near-absence of literature on specific women's rights organizations in Lebanon, and the relatively small amount of research regarding women's rights in Lebanon as a whole, there is adequate theoretical discourse to analyze KAFA effectively. This theory will allow me to utilize discussions of women's resistance and gender-based violence from other regions and contexts outside of Lebanon to conceptualize how the KAFA organization and its campaigns contribute to a women's rights movement in Lebanon.

Nancy Frasier's discussion on what she calls a counter public is particularly useful to understand KAFA's representation of a disenfranchised group functioning in a public space, both with other disenfranchised groups and the dominant patriarchal majority. She created her term counter public as a pointed critique of Jurgen Habermas' idea of public space as a democratized area for discussion regardless of class. Habermas' conception of a democratized space noticeably left out women, lesbians, gays, bi-sexuals, transexuals, and those questioning their sexuality. His idea of a democratized space advocated for men to simply put aside their differences in order to engage each other without preconceived notions regarding class or education. Frasier discusses the impossibility and impracticality of this proposal, while advocating for a sphere that will

allow for multiple counter publics to exist at one time in the current age of inequality. Yet where Frasier critiques Habermas, I must also critique Frasier for her oversight of class and racial inequality within disenfranchised peoples. Just as she argues that Habermas fails to understand the impossibility of setting aside class differences between men, so too does she fail to account for women reproducing the patriarchal structure within a women's group. Failing to account for such differences would be a huge disservice to the women experiencing class and racial prejudice from other women. It also assumes that gender is the most important binding identity, and that it overcomes all other forms of inequality. In order to account for this oversight in theoretical analysis, I will introduce Erella Shadmi's discussion of the group The Women in Black to utilize her analytical critique of maintaining class, and additionally racial, awareness throughout this project.

Representations of violence and trauma must remain at the focus of this research, and Susan Sontag's work on voyeurism and the photograph is an essential part of approaching imagery depicting scenes of abuse, attempted suicide, and descriptions of extreme violence. Sontag notes that, "the photographs are a means of making "real" (or more "real") matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore."[23] Photographs, and I would argue other forms of visual culture such as short videos, are particularly useful for conveying painful moments. Arguably more effective than the written word, these visual pieces force the viewer to fully conceptualize the extent of violence on a body or place. While it is certainly possible to read accounts of violence and form them into distinct picture of events, the reader maintains the option of stopping

[23] Sontag, 7

in the middle of a story, or refusing to place the words into a cohesive picture. Visual material, however, cannot be unseen, nor is there is a middle point when viewing a picture that would allow for the viewer to stop short of seeing the full image. In this way, the benefits of a picture compactly fitting large amounts of information into a single and easily accessible image simultaneously function as its danger.

During my interview with Maya Ammar, she told me that when KAFA began using images of parents mourning their daughters who were victims of domestic violence, the audience could no longer ignore femicide in Lebanon. These pictures shocked an audience into reality, demanding attention and requiring empathy with a pain that words alone could not convey. Reflecting on Sontag's discussion of visual culture, images tell stories in different ways, eliciting a visceral response from the viewer that may differ from the intellectualized formulation of words into a picture. Often, advocacy or human rights groups utilize difficult images specifically because viewers have a more difficult experience coming to terms with an image or forgetting it once seen. Despite the use of violent imagery to inspire viewers to action, Sontag discusses the problems that arise in such an attempt. Voyeurism remains an enemy to meaningful action; Sontag notes that with the advent of a highly mobile camera, for the first time, pictures and cameras brought the very image of death to an audience in an up-close manner from a distant vantage point, "Picture-taking acquired an immediacy and authority greater than any verbal account in conveying the horror of mass-produced death."[24] She discusses the hunger for such images, noting the vast production of images with Jesus on the cross,

[24] Sontag, 24

tortured, or naked. Creators and distributors of violent imagery often utilize such imagery with the intention of educating unaware audiences through exposing them to otherwise inaccessible life situations. While this intention may be commendable, an audience with no previous exposure to a particular violent situation may simultaneously learn about the experience while satisfying a perverse urge to somehow experience the event through the pain of others.

With the advent of the death photograph, viewers possessed the ability to peak into the realm of mortality, attaining what many believed was a greater understanding of death itself. So too do other pictures of violence allow an audience to have the sensation of being another participant in a violent situation through picturing her or himself in the image. This type of voyeurism gives the viewer a feeling of gratification. Through viewing a grotesque or intensely violent piece of visual culture, the audience believes it then has a degree of knowledge of how the violence functions or why it occurs. This knowledge is then used as a sort of victory over the violence; to understand violence is to have command of it, and therefore the ability to overcome it. There is a difficult balance in producing imagery that deeply affects people in a way to motivate them rather than either satisfying a craving for the unknowable or driving the viewer to complacency. When Sontag notes that, "Perhaps the only people with the right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order are those who could do something to alleviate it," she indicates the human tendency of blocking out imagery or situations that appear unsolvable. These situations prompt emotional fatigue, leaving the viewer unable to take any other action than simply consuming the image.

This thesis will attempt to read Susan Sontag's ideas into KAFA's use of violent imagery within campaign strategies. First, it is of the utmost importance to view the following images, videos, and stories as part of KAFA's mission to humanize. Paying witness to the visual culture as stories to be condemned and prevented rather than as opportunities to experience someone else's suffering gives the victims their subjectivity when they previously were only the objects of violence. Moreover, many of the images themselves present a message of prevention. KAFA's campaigns embody Sontag's message that a viewer of violent material may shut down and tune out when presented with extreme forms of violence without any option for recourse. Instead, KAFA's visual material should be understood as a means to end gender based violence through giving voice back to the voiceless, showing the multiple sides of victimhood, offering recourse in situations of violence, and encouraging the active participation of the victims and their witnesses to both stop violence and prevent it.

The following three chapters discuss KAFA's campaign strategies to illustrate its methods for broader change in women's rights within Lebanon. Through employing a case study methodology, I situate the organization KAFA within a broader contextual argument regarding the current state of women's rights, keeping questions of nationalism and classism at the forefront. Susan Sontag's discussion of voyeurism and visual culture provide a useful structure for presenting the following information, while Nancy Frasier's idea of the counter public along with Erella Shadmi's critique of class allow for a careful criticism of gender and class in Lebanon.

Chapter 2: The presence of Women's Rights in Lebanese History and KAFA in the Present

The current situation of political and national disenfranchisement and violence for women in Lebanon certainly does not represent the noticeably progressive, and at times aggressive, history of women's rights in the country. By all accounts, the women's rights movements leading up to the bid for freedom from the French Mandate, and the subsequent period between Lebanese Independence in 1943 until the onset of the Civil War in 1976, steadily gained momentum and very well could have continued to garner results had it gone unimpeded. Hala Maksoud notes that the first recorded time of Lebanese women's political activism occurred in 1914 when the Organization of Arab Women in Beirut sent a letter to the Arab Congress held in 1923.[25] Following the start of their political activity, Lebanese women continued to maintain ties with other women's groups throughout the Middle East, taking their hijabs off in 1923 in solidarity with Huda Sha'rawi's historical precedent.[26] The women's movement experienced an incredible amount of growth in women's activities in the early 20th century, including increased political participation and the founding of organizations leading to educational and health benefits for other women. Yet the fervency of women's rights was put on hold in order to promote the Lebanese nationalist desire to break from French control. When the Lebanese gained their independence in 1943, women re-invigorated their efforts to gain universal suffrage. Women garnered the right to vote in 1953; however, Mona Chemali

[25] Maksoud, "The Case of Lebanon." pg. 89
[26] Ibid. pg. 89

Khalaf notes that the intensification of women's support for nationalist rights while decreasing action for women's rights in particular was the first of several moments that disrupted the forward movement of women's rights in Lebanon.

The fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War between 1975-1990 again disrupted the progression of women's rights. Though discussions regarding women's rights did not altogether cease, they were rife with sectarian divisions and patriarchal loyalties that deterred real and lasting progress. Both Lina Khatib in *Gender, Citizenship and Political Agency* and Evelyn Accad in *Sexuality and Sexual Politics* note that during times of war or negative peace, women's concerns become subservient to the notion of survival. Women focus on working or obtaining provisions in order to keep their family alive, not to further their rights. For women to focus on their rights during times of conflict could be construed as a betrayal of the larger nationalist cause. During the Lebanese Civil War, women came together from varying confessions to move forward an idea of feminism. What resulted was intense separation between the political enemies and a refusal to criticize men from their own political group. The women were hesitant to discuss personal issues with women of other groups, likely coming from a fear of weakening their own sectarian position or reprisal from the dominant men in their lives.

Following the Lebanese Civil War, a stagnant time for progress in women's rights, the Lebanese government took steps intended to improve conditions for women in the country. In 1997, the government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), with the National Committee for Lebanese Women's Affairs being founded in 1998 to promote women's rights and take

responsibility for submitting subsequent reports to the United Nations regarding the current state of women in Lebanon. A consistent critique of CEDAW in response to NCLW's reports is a critique that women's rights organizations in Lebanon take up as an anthem: Personal status laws, laws that differ country to country but determine the rights of men and women regarding marriage, divorce, child custody and divorce, must be changed. It is difficult to tell whether or not these efforts for equality resulted in real changes for women; personal status laws and the vicious Kafala system for domestic migrant workers have changed little, if at all, since the ratification of CEDAW.

Despite the lack of institutionalized assistance and safeguards for women's rights, Lebanese women radically changed their political activism and organization following the Assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Droves of Lebanese citizens from every sectarian background flooded the streets, gathering in Martyr's Square to protest in what was an unparalleled amount of cooperation between confessional groups. Women and men commemorated their leader and demanded that whoever was responsible for Hariri's death be held accountable. The Cedar Revolution, also known as the Lebanese Spring Revolution, led to the final withdrawal of Syrian forces and government involvement in Lebanese affairs that had persisted since the Civil War. In her chapter, "Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution," Rita Stephan argues that the very image of the Lebanese women was transformed through their development into politically active citizens in unprecedented levels of visibility.[27]

[27] Stephan, "Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution." pg. 175

The Western press also seized upon this image of the politically engaged woman, constructing a narrative of the western-influenced Lebanese woman demanding rights through a secular and democratic process. When *Newsweek* and *The Economist* covered the Cedar Revolution after the Hariri assassination, they used two separate photos of women: both on men's shoulders, both without hijab, and both in western clothing.[28] This indicated to the Western World that change was coming; a change toward equality for women, a change towards the western conception of democracy, and a movement away from a conservative society. Despite the blatant Orientalist overtones, these Western magazines picked up on the growing sentiment even among the Lebanese that this was a defining moment for all of Lebanon, and especially Lebanese women. Women from all confessional backgrounds, cutting across all socio-economic positions and political party affiliations came together to conduct sit-ins, organize protests, and demonstrate against the unknown threat to the foundations of a free Lebanon.

In this same year of unprecedented political action, KAFA, a group that would become a predominant force in the fight for women's rights, was founded in 2005 in Beirut, Lebanon. KAFA, a term meaning "enough" in Arabic, is a feminist, non-confessional, non-governmental, and secular civil society organization combatting violence against women and gender-based violence. In addition to advocating for gender reforms, KAFA's services extend to protection for the family against violence, including children, as well as protection of domestic migrant workers from abuses, trafficking, and

[28] Vlahos, "No Color-Coded Revolution for Afghanistan by Kelley B. Vlahos -- Antiwar.com.", "Cracking The Cedar."

prostitution. KAFA remains a small women's rights organization, but its profile is growing to become one of the most well-known and frequently cited women's rights organizations in Lebanon.

Without statistical analysis existing on women's rights organizations in Lebanon to bolster this claim, other evidence, including the level of social media outreach, gives a hint as to KAFA's presence throughout the country. At the time of this thesis (3/21/15), KAFA currently has 63,106 "likes" on Facebook, while one of the other most prominent women's rights organizations, Nasawiya, has 18, 625 "likes" on Facebook. Additionally, KAFA's Twitter account has nearly double the amount of followers as Nasawiya, with 13,600 followers compared to 6,233 followers respectively. At the very least, these numbers indicate a widespread audience for KAFA's social media outreach, a necessary part of its campaign strategies.

KAFA's campaign strategies are vital to the continued progress of the organization's goals and outreach. As Maya Ammar noted in an interview I conducted with her in January of 2015, the current infrastructure of the group is extremely limited, with very few permanent staff members and a heavy reliance on volunteer help. She indicated that the organization is currently receiving more volunteers to help with KAFA than the organization placement for these people, with 600+ volunteers offering their services in the last year. With a small staff and an overwhelming amount of work to do for women's rights in Lebanon, KAFA's campaigns garner public interest and support in order to create a large base of volunteers and future activists.

This chapter will first discuss the organizational structure of KAFA and the roles its members play in constructing a women's rights organization. It will focus on the identities of the women involved, specifically their class, educational, and sectarian backgrounds. Lebanon is a country renowned for its sectarian-based governmental system, with religious affiliation determining a Lebanese citizen's primary identity. The reasons for this system come from a long history of Christian, Druze, Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, and Jewish populations residing in what is currently the modern nation state of Lebanon.

When the country was founded in 1926 following World War I and the breaking apart of the Ottoman Empire, the country consisted of a majority Christian population, with significant Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze minorities. The government was then apportioned between these groups stemming from the only census ever taken in Lebanon. A Maronite Christian is always the President, a Sunni Muslim is always the Prime Minister and a Shi'a Muslim is always the Speaker of the House. The other minority communities, including Greek Orthodox, Druze, and Armenian groups among others, are given a designated number of seats in Parliament. Though Maronite Christians almost certainly no longer make up the majority of the Lebanese Population, each sectarian group resists conducting a census or changing the Constitution from its current state in order to prevent a power grab by any one confession. By appearances, this government boasts a democratic process and fair holdings, yet Lebanon sits precariously on the ever-present potential for underlying sectarian grudges to violently erupt. In this atmosphere of

negative peace and perpetual discontent, the identity of a women's rights group claiming to represent all women is prioritized.

This chapter will additionally discuss KAFA's campaign implementation since its founding in 2005. The group has initiated campaigns on all fronts, engaging the state structure through their Internal Security Forces Campaign and Name and Shame Campaign, engaging the Lebanese public through their Zalfa and Ride Along Campaign, and engaging those doubly marginalized by the system through their campaigns against Domestic Migrant Worker abuses like Raise Shawwa's Voice. KAFA constructs each campaign for a particular audience, utilizing various visual materials to get its message out to the Lebanese public through a multitude of communicative mediums. This chapter will explore why KAFA chose to develop certain campaign strategies at the time they did, specifically relating to societal concerns and KAFA's own goals at the time, how they implemented these campaigns, and what these campaigns look like.

KAFA'S CAMPAIGNS: ENGAGING THE STATE, ENGAGING THE PUBLIC, AND ENGAGING THE KAFALA SYSTEM

Engaging the State Apparatus:

While KAFA exists first and foremost as a resource for women to seek help and guidance to escape from situations of domestic violence, an integral part of its work is the long-sighted goal to create a state infrastructure that provides protections for women. KAFA engages the Lebanese state structure through several of its campaigns, most noteworthy

the group's "Name and Shame" campaign, as well as its campaign to build bridges between women and members of the Internal Security Forces, "We Have a Mission. If you're threatened, do not hesitate to call 112." This second campaign is also a part of the larger "White Ribbon Campaign" that KAFA participates in every year in an effort to involve more men in the fight against domestic violence. Each campaign is a necessary part of addressing the institutionalized violence and permission for violence that permeates the Lebanese state.

Name and Shame Campaign:

In 2007, KAFA began drafting a law that would protect women and children from domestic violence. In less than three years, this bill came to fruition and the Lebanese cabinet approved the draft law on April 6, 2010. The bill was then sent on to an 8-member Parliamentary Committee to study the draft law in 2011 and it finalized its amendments in 2012. While the Committee was going over the bill, KAFA rightfully feared for the changes that the Committee would make to the bill. One

Figure: 2.1

of the primary concerns was that the Committee would alter the section of the bill criminalizing marital rape, including coercion practices. During the period when the committee was in session, KAFA lobbied this committee composed of eight Ministers of Parliament to leave the bill unchanged and the criminalization of marital rape intact. KAFA took up what it called its "Name and Shame" campaign in order to facilitate the organization's lobbying attempts. A brilliant strategy, the concept of naming and shaming utilizes the tactic of releasing a well-known figure's name and/or face into the public sphere to encourage, or intimidate, this figure into choosing the action desired by those protesting. This campaign worked on two fronts: it released the names and faces of those on the eight member committee overseeing this bill and it released the names of the Ministers of Parliament who had not yet signed on their support of the bill.

KAFA implemented its campaign through a video, also used as a television commercial, and a poster showing the pictures of all of the MP's on the Committee for the bill. Figure 2.1 contains the pictures of the eight MP's charged with amending the bill, with the text reading, "Marital Rape is also a crime! The Law is in your image! Don't maim the legislation that protects women from domestic violence!"[29] Below the photograph are the names of the organizations that signed on to help KAFA develop this bill. Online, this particular photograph was picked up and used primarily by Lebanese bloggers, as well as various Middle Eastern news sites such as *The Daily Star, The Arab Digest*, and *el-Akhbar English*. KAFA also took this image to the streets, with Ammar noting that these images were plastered inside buses for the public to see. The goal,

[29] Haddad, "Fighting Domestic Violence in Lebanon."

Ammar said, was to raise Lebanese citizens' awareness of the committee's amendments to the bill, which opposed the explicit language condemning violence against women as well as the categorization of marital rape as rape.

In addition to this image that KAFA put up around the city and into the minds of consuming citizens, the organization also utilized the video image of these MPs to name and shame them. It put up a YouTube video on November 23, 2011 that displays the names and faces of every member of the subcommittee. The video, lasting 34 seconds, dramatically displays each member for approximately 2-4 seconds, zooming on to the seven male faces and one female face, with each name coming up in bold. The eight members of the subcommittee included Samir Jisr, Nabil Nicolas, Ghassan Moukheiber, Michel Helou, Gilbert Zouein, Ali Ammar, Imad Hout, and Shant Janjanian. In the bottom corner of the screen, text reads, "The subcommittee for studying the law protecting women from domestic violence." As each picture moves into the next, there is a voiceover stating the names of the subcommittee. This same video appeared as a commercial on most Lebanese stations, although Future TV and the Hariri Channel, took it off within a few days.[30] The image served as a powerful tool for KAFA; bringing public awareness to both the existence of the bill against domestic violence, and the names of the members responsible for determining the future of women's safety in Lebanon.

[30] Ibid.

The second part of KAFA's Name and Shame campaign was more informal, and primarily taken up by web bloggers. Lists of the MP's who did not sign the petition at the time were passed around websites to educate the public on those unsupportive of the bill. This image (see Figure 2.2) is particularly interesting as it breaks up 49 MP's into color-coded political groups.[31] The MP's are spread across sectarian groups, yet the numbers have higher concentrations in the Shi'a parties, Amal Movement and Hezbollah, as well as the Sunni party, the Future Movement.

Figure: 2.2



KAFA's Name and Shame campaign relied on public consumption of images and videos to expose the names of the Members of Parliament on the subcommittee and those within Parliament. The organization spread these images through the press, television stations, bloggers, and on media throughout the city to reach a wide and diverse audience. The poster and the video put forward a consistent message of accountability through not only releasing the names of the public figures, but also displaying their pictures in a framing that looks as if they are being captured on a private investigator's camera. This

[31] Majed, "Failing to Stand against Domestic Violence."

framing coincides with Maya's statement that the public should be monitoring their elected officials. Instead of the Parliamentarians taking responsibility for the public good, KAFA gave the public the tools to hold the Parliamentarians accountable for their actions.

16 Days of Activism: The White Ribbon Campaign and the Internal Security Forces Campaign: "We Have a Mission. If you're threatened, do not hesitate to call 112"

The 16 Days of Activism is an international event that takes places annually between November 25, International Day for Elimination of Violence Against Women, and December 10, Human Rights Day. The event is a symbolic marriage of the two days, illustrating how gender-based violence negates the human right to equality for women. KAFA actively participates in the 16 Days of Activism in Lebanon, launching two of its most prominent campaigns during the event. KAFA first launched the White Ribbon Campaign in 2010 and re-launches it every year on November 25. The White Ribbon Campaign specifically targets Lebanese boys and men, inviting them to take an active stance against violence towards women. The ISF Campaign was also launched on November 25, 2012 with the goal of fostering a better relationship between the police force and abused women. Both campaigns go hand in hand as they reach out to traditional members and perpetuators of the patriarchal system of violence in the country to take an active part in educating themselves and others about all forms of gender-based violence.

The White Ribbon Campaign's goals primarily seek to educate men on the prevalence of violence committed against women, and to garner their commitment to be allies to women. KAFA designed the campaign to initiate conversations with men regarding gender-based violence with the intention that the men would continue the conversations with each other, taking their knowledge to other forums to further the discussion. During the 16 Days of Activism, KAFA asks men to commit themselves to a life free from violence against women, and to stand with women in various exercises. In 2011, an example of these exercises included a human chain to show solidarity between Lebanese men and women while the bill to protect women and children from domestic violence was in Parliament. That same year KAFA took the White Ribbon Campaign to various Lebanese University Campuses, setting up booths to conduct community outreach. Sports matches and various competitions that traditionally are associated with conceptions of masculinity accompanied the informational outlets at the American University of Beirut, Balamand University, the Lebanese American University, and Haigazian University.[32]

KAFA launched a new White Ribbon Campaign in 2012 acknowledging the support of Lebanese celebrities and challenging common conceptions of masculinity. During the launch, KAFA presented awards to the two male MPs, Shant Jianjian and Nabil Nicolas, who resigned from their posts on the subcommittee that amended KAFA's

[32] "The 'White Ribbon' Campaign in Universities-Lebanon | Engagingmen.net - A Gender Justice Information Network."

bill to protect women and children from domestic violence.[33] KAFA also acknowledged two celebrities who have vocally supported KAFA, Ziad El Samad and Badih Abou Chakra. El Samad is the goalkeeper for the Lebanese national football (soccer) team, as well as for El Safa' SC. He participated in the third season of a show called Celebrity Duets, where he pledged to donate his Celebrity Duets award to KAFA.[34] Chakra is a famous Lebanese actor who appeared in KAFA's commercial to raise public awareness during the 16 Days of Activism. These commercials show Chakra flexing his muscles, revealing his possession of a gun, wearing a tattoo with a black tank top, dressed in a suit flashing money, and raising his hand poised to slap an imaginary figure. At the end of the commercial, which KAFA also posted on their YouTube channel, Chakra bows his head in shame. The message is simple and straightforward, yet leaves a significant impact.

KAFA's proposed bill to protect women and children from gender-based violence included an important article calling for the creation of a special Internal Security Forces (ISF) unit. This unit would include three women and would take steps to understand the situation of gender-based violence in Lebanon and appropriate ways to approach situations of domestic violence. KAFA proposed this particular article as a result of a long-history of mishandling or completely disregarding situations of domestic violence. It is no secret in Lebanon that domestic violence cases are often viewed as a private manner within the family. Many people are hesitant to report cases of domestic violence, even going so far as to deem them appropriate if the wife is perceived as misbehaving. The

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[33] {Citation}Taylor, "Women Rights Campaign Tackles Gender Roles | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."
[34] "LBCI | Celebrity Duets Ziad-Al-Samad."

relegation of domestic violence and gender-based violence to the private sphere has resulted in the Internal Security Forces ignoring situations of domestic violence, as well as not reporting these situations for medical or judiciary documentation. Moreover, up until the early 2000's, women were not allowed to serve in the Internal Security Forces. This reinforced patriarchal viewpoints of women being the weaker gender and without physical power. Men in the ISF often deferred domestic abuse cases to the local leaders in the community, effectively severing any form of recourse for women experiencing gender-based violence. Additionally, the masochistic attitudes of an all-male ISF prevented women from receiving the help in domestic abuse situations that they so desperately needed.

KAFA launched their "We have a mission; if you're threatened, do not hesitate to call 112" campaign on November 25, 2013. The campaign seeks to foster trust and communication between the Internal Security Forces and women in Lebanon. In order for the ISF to be a viable option for confronting situations of gender-based violence, both women and the wider public must trust that the ISF will adequately and compassionately handle violent situations when they are called for help.

Figure: 2.3

KAFA designed this campaign as public outreach to encourage people's reliance on the ISF in gender-based violence situations. The organization launched this particular campaign during their ongoing project called "The Role of the Internal Security Forces in Combatting Family Violence." At the time of the campaign's launch, KAFA and the ISF had already worked to create and implement a teaching manual for gender-based violence for the ISF, the General Directorate of the ISF issuing a note on proper ways to deal with gender-based violence, the creation of special judiciary units that will undertake reports of gender-based violence, the creation of new rooms and utilization of new equipment for a medical team to perform exams on women, and the training of 175 ISF members for participation in the aforementioned tasks.

The visual part of the campaign took shape in two distinct ways: the illustration of male ISF members dedicated to compassionately addressing situations of gender-based violence, and the newly implemented participation of female ISF members (See Figure 2.3). On KAFA's website, their campaign features a poster with a male ISF member slightly in front and to the right of a presumably Lebanese women.[35] The poster utilizes the name of the campaign as a slogan for action, "We have a mission, if you are threatened, do not hesitate to call us-112." With both the ISF member and the woman somber-looking in appearance, the poster indicates that the ISF member will be the barrier between the victim and the perpetrator. A distinct departure from previous conceptions of the ISF, this poster indicates to the viewer that the ISF is prepared to insert itself in situations of gender-based violence.

[35] "KAFA | Launch of the Campaign."

This message is magnified through a short video campaign on KAFA's YouTube channel. Lasting 36 seconds, the video illustrates an intimate home scene that quickly escalates from verbal abuse to physical violence. The video shows the parallel situations between a husband removing his belt to beat his wife to a ISF member suiting up to go into public space, as well as the husband raising his belt to bring down to an ISF member handing the wife a glass of water and taking her in to take her statement. The actors in the video never speak, dramatic and increasingly intensified music plays over the abusive scenes, with a narrator coming in during the last moments to again re-state the mission of this campaign. The parallel effect throughout the video indicates the ISF's preparation to respond to each part of the domestic abuse situation, from stopping the violence to comforting the victim, and eventually taking her statement to begin the process of judicial repercussions. While the ISF member is suiting up, he salutes the camera. An interesting addition to the video, this pose indicates that part of the ISF's duties in serving her or his country is to protect the vulnerable members of society. Pairing this pose with the ISF member going directly into the women's home and sitting at her kitchen table with her before taking her into a police station for a statement indicates that the ISF believes it is

their responsibility and part of their job to directly intervene in formerly private situations of gender-based violence. Though this illustration seeks to ameliorate widespread perceptions of the male ISF members as potential perpetrators of violence themselves, it also puts forward the image that a woman needs a male as a protector. The following illustration with a women ISF member taking the place of a male ISF member partially remedies this issue, yet the reality is that very few women are in the ISF, meaning that most situations of domestic violence will be handled by a male ISF member.

For this particular campaign, KAFA also created a separate poster with a female ISF member (See Figure 2.4).[36] This poster mirrors the poster featuring the male ISF poster, displaying the female ISF member standing between the hypothetical victim and the viewer. Again, both people in the poster are somber in mood, and their physical positioning conveys the message that the ISF member will stand in front of the victim for protection. This poster promotes the cooperation between the ISF and Lebanese women in situations of gender-based violence, while also illustrating the progression of the ISF to include female members and move toward a system of equality even within the police force itself.

Figure: 2.4

[36] "KAFA | إطلاق حملة 'وراننا مهمة' بالتعاون مع قوى الأمن الداخلي."

Engaging the Public:

In addition to creating infrastructure through the state apparatus to assist women in situations of gender-based violence, KAFA engages the public sphere through several campaigns in order to bring private issues into public space. Though KAFA has taken numerous initiatives to instigate this change, two of their campaigns in particular utilize interesting communicative practices to reach out to and interact with the public, "Zalfa" and the "Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride."

Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride

KAFA launched their Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride Campaign to create a situation where women must either stay silent or confront a situation of abuse. KAFA intended to create bonds of solidarity between women as they quite literally went along for this abusive ride. Whether or not the women choose to speak up, they are put into a situation where they cannot simply walk away or close their eyes and ears to abuse. KAFA put up the video documenting these interactions on YouTube on March 16, 2014, stating that the experiment was conducted with the permission of Banet Taxis of Beirut to utilize their services. The organization's use of Banet Taxis is an integral part of the experiment as these taxis are designed for women's use only. Painted a distinctly bright pink color to apparently indicate the gendered nature of the car, the taxi company markets

itself as a safe ride for women.[37] Unfortunately for the group of women in this video, what was expected to be a safe and quiet ride will turn into a demand for action.

The video, lasting one minute and 45 seconds, shows the interactions between seven women riders, three taxi drivers, and one very irate GPS system. Taking place in the busy and congested streets of Beirut, Lebanon, the taxi driver is expected to follow the directions of the GPS in order to quickly and efficiently get the taxi rider from their pick-up point to final destination. In the video, six of the riders speak in Lebanese Arabic and one woman speaks in English, however, the voice of the GPS is distinctly British. Typical of KAFA's videos and documentation, the video is also subtitled in English to allow for a wider viewing audience. All of the unsuspecting women of different ages and backgrounds appear comfortable before the quick escalation of verbal abuse directed at their taxi driver. The video moves from the GPS voice becoming agitated to shouting vulgar insults at the driver. All of the riders are visibly uncomfortable at this drastic escalation in abuse. At the end of the video, mirroring the end of the taxi ride from hell for these women, KAFA sends a text message to the riders with the Arabic and English message, "If you witness abuse, don't sit back and ignore it." The text message also includes the KAFA hotline for help, asking the women to share it with victims of abuse. In the YouTube video, the audience views KAFA's request for a pledge of solidarity with abuse victims and the hashtag "#iwillspeakup" to indicate this pledge of solidarity. This video is a somber reminder that victims trapped in situations of abuse do not have the luxury to get off their own ride from hell. Through encouraging solidarity with abuse

[37] "Banet Taxi :: Beirut.com :: Beirut City Guide."

victims, KAFA is demanding that change come through a community of women refusing to ignore individual situations of abuse within the larger system of patriarchy.

Zalfa

KAFA uses another campaign, Zalfa, as an interactive tool to communicate information to the wider public regarding Law 293 that the Parliament passed in 2014. Launched in November 2014, KAFA introduced the campaign to inform women of their rights following Parliament's passing of Law 293 while also highlighting the failures of the law. Primarily an informational campaign, Zalfa aims to protect women from further violence and warn them of certain repercussions should they take action against their abusers, while also empowering victims of domestic violence to become aware of their options and utilize the judicial system to their advantage.

On November 14, 2014, KAFA posted a picture with a blurred-out woman on its Facebook page with the question, "Who is Zalfa?" This question was the extraordinary introduction to an interactive avatar named Zalfa. Zalfa is an animated character created by the software company, SoftImpact, but she is the face of a domestic violence survivor in Lebanon.[38] Zalfa takes form on a variety of front, including a Facebook and Twitter Campaign, YouTube videos, which are also shown on news segments on the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI), and in informational pamphlets on KAFA's website. Zalfa claims no religious background; only that she is also a Lebanese woman who has experienced violence, prejudice, and discrimination because of her

[38] https://www.facebook.com/kafa.lb/photos/pb.323356544336.-2207520000.1425750630./10152829002369337/?type=3&theater

gender identity. She appears casual, without any particular socio-economic identifiers (See Figure 2.5).[39] Zalfa is designed to appeal to any woman, providing a safe space for difficult questions regarding violence and domestic abuse.

The majority of Zalfa's campaign information derives from KAFA's website, outlining who Zalfa is, her answers to common questions, and loopholes in Law 293 that women must consider in abusive situations. KAFA's goal with Zalfa is to create a

Figure: 2.5

campaign of awareness and disseminate information, while also engaging women in the fight against Parliamentary members' harmful amendments to the original bill. In particular, this campaign addresses the amendments allowing men to claim marital rights in cases of marital rape, the issues with protection of children in situations of domestic violence dependent on age of custody, and the right of the victim to obtain protection orders from public prosecution. On KAFA's website, the organization created both an Arabic and an English version of Zalfa's 11 questions accompanied by explanations of

[39] "KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation's... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook."

terms and conditions. These questions are easily accessible, allowing for women to know their rights without sacrificing their privacy in certain situations. Additionally, these questions are turned into pictures for KAFA's Facebook and Twitter accounts, and adapted into videos for KAFA's YouTube account. The videos on YouTube are particularly helpful because they bring the information to life in an unobtrusive way. In fifteen short videos, each approximately 15 seconds in length, Zalfa brings to life questions regarding domestic abuse and Law 293, as well as examples of the implementation of Law 293. Zalfa's friendly demeanor, her presentation of information regarding domestic violence through written documents, spoken explanations, and illustrated examples, and the dissemination of information on various social and news mediums illustrate how Zalfa's message is accessible and welcoming.

Engaging the Kafala System:

KAFA's interest in women's rights extends beyond concern for those born with a Lebanese national identity to include the safety and well being of women within Lebanese borders. One of the more controversial systems in Lebanon, the Kafala system is based on the premise of employers paying for a domestic migrant worker to come to Lebanon from their home country and work for their employer in a situation considered to be human trafficking and modern day slavery. Many employers go through an agency in order to find the domestic workers, and this agency assists in both paying for the worker to come to Lebanon and the subsequent harsh disciplining of the workers if they resist their employers. The employer usually holds the domestic worker's visa, meaning

that the worker cannot leave the house without risking arrest from the General Security force in Lebanon. These migrant workers usually leave their own countries because they are facing financial difficulties and must find a way to support themselves and their families. Upon their arrival in Lebanon, they face the possibility of submitting themselves to verbal, situational, physical, and sexual abuses in order to support their family in their home country. They are often restricted from eating or leaving the homes of their employers, and many do not receive a day off of work during the week. They are faced with a hostile situation all around as the employer may abuse the worker, the employer may ask the original agency that brought the domestic worker in to the country to abuse the domestic worker, or if the domestic worker attempts to escape the abuse and leave the house without a visa, they risk the General Security force arresting them and subjecting them to further physical and sexual abuse. Domestic migrant workers are excluded from Lebanon's Labor Laws and therefore have little recourse to protest their poor treatment and abuses.[40]

Fields of Action

From its founding, KAFA's mission included protecting domestic migrant workers from physical and sexual exploitation. Similar to its campaigns against domestic violence, KAFA engages both the state structure and the public sphere to instigate lasting change and promise for migrant domestic workers. Several of the group's smaller campaigns, including helping to draft an anti-trafficking bill, releasing policy papers to

[40] Jureidini and Moukarbel, "Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon." pg. 598

raise awareness, and compiling difficult to find information on the suicides of nine domestic workers, have led to its newest campaign regarding domestic migrant workers called “Raise Shawwa’s Voice.”

KAFA considers one of its four “Fields of Action” to be battling the Exploitation and Trafficking in Women. Through educating the public on the current situation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, KAFA hopes to inspire the public to outrage and mass movement for the rights of domestic workers in the Kafala system. As a part of this campaign, KAFA has released several policy papers and undertaken various studies in order to promote education on the topic. On June 24, 2010, the organization released the paper on its website, “Servant, Daughter, or Employee? A Pilot Study on the Attitudes of Lebanese Employers towards Migrant Domestic Workers,” on April 11, 2001 they released two studies, “An Exploratory Study on Social and Psychoanalytic Factors in the Abuse of Domestic Migrant Workers by Female Employers in Lebanon,” and, “Trafficking of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon: A Legal Analysis, by Kathleen Hamill.” In 2012, KAFA undertook the difficulty of suggesting an alternative system for the Kafala system through its paper, “Policy Paper for Reforming the “Sponsorship System” for Migrant Domestic Workers: Towards an Alternative Governance Scheme,” and more recently in 2014 KAFA conducted the study, “DREAMS For Sale: The Exploitation of Domestic Workers from Recruitment in Nepal and Bangladesh to Working in Lebanon.” KAFA includes on its website additional newsletters and manuals highlighting the plight of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.

Accompanying these larger studies, KAFA brings attention to the voice of the migrant domestic worker through compiling stories of their lives and deaths. An important aspect of KAFA's campaigning for migrant domestic workers' rights, these compilations move away from an intellectualized exercise to an empathetic peak into the horrors migrant domestic workers face in Lebanon. Both of these parts are integral for obtaining freedoms for domestic workers and illustrate the need to explore the issue through multiple lenses. In 2010, KAFA went to the local newspapers to compile nine stories of migrant domestic workers' suicides between August and September 2010. Though little information is given, with three stories even lacking the name of the victim, these compilations serve as a memorial mourning the lost lives of those who found no justice through the Lebanese judicial system and whose only path to freedom was through their own suicides.[41] In another small booklet that KAFA printed out with the assistance of Anti-Slavery International on May 2, 2014 called, "If Not for the System," 19 migrant domestic workers tell their stories through the form of letters. The letters are an intimate look inside the lives of migrant domestic workers, predominantly detailing their hardships and abuses.

[41] "KAFA | Silent Deaths."

"Raise Shawwa's Voice"

KAFA's most recent campaign, Raise Shawwa's Voice, reflects KAFA's increasing use of video and interactive public engagement to spread its messages. This campaign, launched on Facebook on February 6, 2015 and on the organization's website on February 18, 2015, centers around a video of a woman and migrant domestic worker named Shawwa (See Figure 2.6).[42] Both sites provide a link to a page with a video of Shawwa and her story. The website reveals little information about Shawwa; the viewer later discovers that she has been working in Lebanon for three years. Her location of origin is unknown, yet this fluidity in identity allows for her to raise the voice of a more inclusive group of migrant domestic workers. It can be reasonably inferred that Showa is in her twenties. Yet what is perhaps most interesting about this story is that there is at first no sound. As the website supposedly downloads, it prompts the viewer to turn on her or his computer speakers.

Figure: 2.6

Once the video loads, the Shawwa begins moving her mouth, as if she is trying to speak but words cannot quite come out. The side of the website lights up and again there is an arrow asking for the viewer to move the slider up the sound bar in order to better hear Shawwa speak. Yet Shawwa's words still do not come; instead, the site brings up a

[42] "KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation's... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook."

notification saying, “Can’t Hear? That’s because Shawwa, like thousands of domestic workers in Lebanon, can’t be heard speaking up for their rights. Raise Shawwa’s Voice. By sharing, you will hear Shawwa and help spread her message.” Below this notification are the two options of sharing her story on Facebook or Twitter. In order to hear Shawwa’s voice, the viewer must participate in its dissemination. The automated message following the choice of Facebook or Twitter is: “I helped Shawwa be heard and demand serious investigation into the deaths of domestic workers. #RaiseShawwasVoice www.raiseshawwasvoice.org.” Shawwa proceeds to detail the procedure for migrant domestic workers trying to escape abuse. Her message is clear; only through those willing to help and lift up the voice of the voiceless will these terrible injustices cease. It is the responsibility of the viewer not only to educate herself or himself participate on the issue, but to educate others as well.

CONCLUSION:

Together, KAFA’s various campaign strategies form a cohesive and powerful platform for combatting gender-based violence on multiple societal levels. This organization utilizes social media, news media, as well as event-based media to disseminate its message to a vast audience base. Its numerous campaigns engage the state apparatus, both the judiciary and the law enforcement system, the public sphere, as well as the Kafala system to combat gender-based violence on different fronts. This organization targets specific communities and societal constructs through each campaign, yet its campaigns are cross-communal projects. In KAFA’s Name and Shame Campaign, it

targeted the members of Parliament who were part of an eight-member subcommittee to amend the bill for protecting women and families from domestic violence, but it also engaged the public through encouraging the public to condemn the MPs. KAFA's campaign for helping migrant domestic workers obtain access and protection under Lebanon's Labor Laws also engages the state apparatus. The ways in which KAFA builds support across these campaigns is an integral part of the organization's campaign strategy, and will be discussed further in later parts of this thesis. Particularly, these strategies illustrate the necessity of creating an entire system of support against gender-based violence instead of engaging any one aspect in isolation.

Chapter 3: Reactions to KAFA's Campaigns: Commendations, Critiques, and Confrontation

The following chapter will discuss the public reaction and results of the campaigns I have described in the previous chapter. I primarily draw on news reports and blog posts to determine the level of public reaction and involvement with KAFA's campaigns following their implementations. In order to analyze the public reactions further, I use Facebook and YouTube to gauge the level of support or negative responses to these various campaigns. For YouTube videos, I will analyze the number of "likes" and "dislikes" as indicated by the viewer, as well as the overall number of views. I will also indicate the number of positive or negative comments on each video if present. For Facebook photos, I will analyze the number of "likes," noting the significant absence of a "dislike" button, while also noting the number of user "shares" to their or someone else's wall, and the comments given under each photo. I further break down these comments into categories of male and female responses, and indicate whether the responses are positive or negative. I also indicate if the response is negative in regards to political policy, but positive to KAFA overall, whether the comment was a joke, if the comment tags another person and whether the comment is indecipherable. Additionally, to ground this chapter, I let the lives of several women affected and destroyed by gender based violence illustrate the reality behind KAFA's campaigns. These campaigns represent the lived experiences of Lebanese women, and the stories behind them remind the reader that

the attitudes and feelings towards these campaigns have very real and far-reaching consequences.

All of the following statistical analysis was conducted on March 18 and 19, 2015. Any additional comments, likes, dislikes, or shares on Facebook and YouTube were not accounted for past these dates. To date, KAFA has 62,535 likes on Facebook and 305 YouTube subscribers. Additionally, please find tables comparatively detailing the following statistical analysis in Chapter 4 in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.[43]

ENGAGING THE STATE APPARATUS-ROQAYA MOUNZER

In the early morning of March 20, 2014, Mohammed M. murdered Roqaya Mounzer after seven years of domestic abuse; she was pregnant with her third child. Similar to many cases of domestic violence in Lebanon, the details are jumbled. Immediately following Mounzer's murder, neighbors began whispering tails of suicide, further obfuscating the reality of the situation. Despite the rumors and speculation, several pieces of factual evidence surfaced following Mounzer's death that painted a very different picture than suicide indeed. Testimony from Mounzer's family illustrates the long years of abuse Mounzer experienced at the hands of her husband. Her father's testimony included a story from before their marriage when he voiced his concern to Mounzer over her future husband's controlling behavior, including an incident where the husband hit Mounzer in the face. The sister, Zeina, tells a similar story, providing stories where she witnessed the

[43] I would like to acknowledge Reem Harb, a Lebanese Citizen and fellow scholar, for her assistance with several Arabeezi and Arabic translations to ensure their reliability.

aftermath of abuse, bruises and bumps covering Mounzer's body. The sister noted that the husband would slap Mounzer in front of the family, an assertion that the husband himself corroborated when he said, "he smacked her on occasion."[44]

Mounzer's husband psychologically abused and manipulated her, a crucial part of the events leading up to her murder. Zeina, her sister, noted that the husband would lock Mounzer in the house when he left, though the husband claims Mounzer had an extra key. The husband also stated that Mounzer did not want to see her family in the year leading up to her death. Taking this statement into consideration with the rest of Mounzer's abuse, her withdrawal may instead have been a typical sign of her husband's controlling and abusive behavior, restricting her relationships with even her family. Both the sister and Maya Ammar from KAFA stated that Mounzer threatened her husband with divorce.[45] The husband would then pose the counter threat of taking full custody of their children.

Perhaps the threat of divorce is what drove Mounzer's husband to shoot his wife point blank in the chest when she knelt before him, pleading for her life on the morning of March 20, 2014. The husband's calm demeanor during his court appearance showed the confidence of a man with his country's laws behind him. Additionally, one of the husband's family members indicated that he was protected by his family, and that this bigger family was also intimidating Roqaya's smaller family.[46] Typical of domestic violence cases in Lebanon, the husband's family desired the issue to be dealt with in

[44] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20222
[45] http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19160
[46] http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-court-indictment-indicates-roqaya-mounzer-was-murdered-her-husband

private-for Roqaya's family to accept their loved one's death and move on. Roqaya's story has disappeared from public speculation, one more instance of domestic violence that demands immediate outrage but burns out quickly. Or, common to many cases of domestic violence, this story has been silenced.

Several pieces of this story point to a structural issue with the political system in Lebanon. Roqaya's proposal of divorce being met with a threat for custody of her children, her former husband's family threatening her family after her death, and the desire for silence surrounding the domestic violence are all indicative of issues with Lebanese personal status laws. These laws in particular create difficulties for women and children in dangerous situations, simultaneously denying women full rights in issues of marriage and custody.

The Lebanese Constitution and Personal Status Laws

Before discussing personal status laws, however, it is necessary to understand the history of the Lebanese Constitution, a document permitting the implementation of these personal status laws in Lebanon. The Lebanese Constitution was created in 1926, four years after the creation of Modern Lebanon. Owing to the unique religious make-up of the country, the Lebanese Constitution was created with the need for each religious sect to maintain a degree of control over each sect's members. Article 9 was placed in the Constitution in order for local religious leaders to maintain their authority under the multi-confessional Lebanese government:

Article 9

> There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and shall guarantees, under its protection the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected.[47]

The authors of the constitution intended this article to provide a means for each religious sect to maintain their own religious identities, preserving laws and customs at a time when a group of people were forced together under one Lebanese nationality. Though the authors of the constitution wrote this article with the hopes of preserving a degree of peace at a time of upheaval, these attempts to preserve the religious identity of each confession resulted in deep fissures between each religious community. Moreover, the religious nature of the Lebanese government and the authority of local religious leaders became problematic for those wishing to have an identity outside of religious boundaries. In 1936, Lebanon issued Decree 60 L.R. stating that a confessional identity was no longer compulsory, allowing for Lebanese citizens to choose their own religious identity or opt out of a religious sect altogether. Those who chose to opt out of a religious identity would instead be subject to a civil code. Despite this option, Lebanon has yet to adopt a Civil Code according to the 1936 Decree's statement.

While each religious group is technically required to submit its personal status laws to Lebanese Parliament for review and ratification, only the Christians, Jews, and Druze have so far submitted their laws for codification. The Sunni group claimed the law infringed on its rights as a religious group and Decree 53 of March 30, 1939 stated that

[47] "The Lebanese Constitution."

this group no longer was required to submit its laws for Parliamentary review. The Shi'a group also refused to submit its personal status laws for ratification. Yet even with Parliamentary review for several of Lebanon's confessional groups' personal status laws, many religious rulings go forward without any judicial oversight. Often, the Lebanese government chooses not to interfere in religious court matters in order to avoid confrontation with religious leaders. Though the Lebanese government chooses to abdicate some degree of power to religious leaders to maintain a delicate balance of peace, the most vulnerable and disenfranchised groups in society, women, children, migrants, experience severe repercussions as a result.

In order to fully understand the level of religious leader's control in a community, and the corresponding need for civil personal status laws, it is necessary to conduct an overview of various Lebanese personal status laws. It is difficult to gain access to each religious group's personal status laws in written form, yet Maya Mikdashi has done an incredible amount of work to research and compile the various Lebanese status laws for her own academic work.[48] This paper will give a brief description of each confession's personal status laws that are relevant to my work on domestic violence and KAFA. Yet, as Mikdashi also notes in her article, it is necessary to keep in mind while studying these laws that their implementation does not always follow the written law. Additionally, many of these laws are very complicated and dependent upon other, sometimes religious, conditions. For the purpose of this thesis, I will only briefly outline personal status laws according to the Lebanese Constitution and Christian, Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze sects:

[48] Mikdashi, "A Legal Guide to Being a Lebanese Woman (Part 1)."

Civil Law

Women are discriminated against within their confessional groups, but discrimination also exists within Lebanese Civil law. According to Lebanese Civil law, only men are able to pass citizenship on to their children. The only two conditions that allow for a woman to pass on citizenship is either after the woman has become naturalized, she is able to pass on citizenship both to her next husband after the naturalization, as well as her children, or if a woman has a baby outside of marriage and no one claims paternity for a year's time. Additionally, women can only be registered under the name of their fathers on a census, marital rape is still legalized in Lebanon, and if a victim marries her rapist (the language constitutes women as the potential victims only), the rapist will not be charged with rape. The woman is able to raise the charges against her rapist again if either she or her rapist husband files for divorce. Up until 2011, Lebanon allowed for reduced sentences under Article 562 for male family members who honor killed a female family member. Additionally, the adultery laws discriminate between men and women; unmarried men who commit adultery are subject to one month to one year in prison, or three months to two years if married, whereas a women, married or unmarried, is subject to three months to two years in prisoned.

Christian Personal Status Laws for Catholics and Greek Orthodox communities:

In regards to Catholic marriage, the legal marriage age for males is 16 with a guardian's permission or 17 without a guardian's permission; the legal age for females is

14 with a guardian's permission or 15 without permission. The conditions for annulment and divorce apply equally for men and women, with annulment approved under certain conditions, usually relating to mental status, and divorce being prohibited. Although the religious courts consider fathers as the legal guardians of children, the mothers are the primary caregivers. This egalitarian view towards custody is likely a result of the prohibition against divorce in the Catholic church. Meaning that though the law sounds egalitarian, it rarely is implemented, although the church does grant separation under certain circumstances.

In regards to Greek Orthodox marriage, the male must be of 17 years of age in order to marry and a female must be 15 years of age. If either the male or female is deemed physically and mentally mature at below these set ages of marriages, they may receive permission to marry. Both the man and woman may ask for an annulment or divorce. Conditions for the annulment are the same for men and women, but in the case of divorce, men and women must provide different evidence. Additionally, men may marry immediately after a divorce but a woman must wait until four months past the divorce before she may marry again. In the case of a divorce, men are the default guardians of the children unless the court finds reason to give custody to the mother. In such a case, the mother would have custody of the children until the boy was 14 years of age and the girl was 15 years of age.

Sunni Personal Status Law:

According to Sunni religious law, males may not marry under the age of 18 unless they are determined to be of maturity, and males may not have a marriage arranged for

them if they are under the age of 17. Females may not marry unless they are 17 years old, but may have permission to marry from religious courts if they have reached maturity, and may not have a marriage arranged for them if they are under the age of nine. Whereas a man may marry a Jewish or Christian woman, a woman may only marry a Muslim man. Only the man may initiate a divorce, unless the man has entered a second marriage and the woman stipulated the right to divorce in conditions prior to the second marriage. A man may also take up to four wives. There are further conditions regarding divorce in Sunni religious law, including that the woman forfeits her belated dowry and alimony if she asks for a divorce, unless conditions stating otherwise were previously established. In cases of divorce, women have custody over their male children until they are seven and their female? children until they are nine, when the father may then enact his legal rights as guardian of his children unless the court rules otherwise.

Shi'a and Jaafari Personal Status Laws:

Under Shi'a personal status laws, there is no required minimum age for marriage for either a male or a female, only that both must have reached maturity. Females, however, do need the permission of their father or grandfather to marry unless certain stipulations apply, and the legal age of consummation for females still remains after the age of nine. Men are able to take up to four wives at one time. Women technically need the permission of men to leave the house, and going against this technically serves as the grounds for divorce. Men and women may obtain an annulment under similar circumstances, yet women may only ask for divorce in exchange for her abdication of her

legal rights. In cases of divorce, the mother maintain custody of their male children until the age of two and their female children until the age of seven, at which time the father takes over custody. The mother may lose custody of the children if she is a non-Muslim woman or if she re-marries.

Druze Personal Status Law:

Under Druze personal status law, Druze males are able to marry at the age of 18; if they are between the ages of 16-18, they may receive special permission to marry from the religious court. Druze females are able to marry at the age of 17, and may receive special permission to marry if they are between the ages of 15-17 if they are able to provide medical proof of their maturity. Though females do not need consent of a man to marry, the religious court notifies the males of the family of a female's intent to marry; if the males do not provide valid reasons for why the marriage should not take place within 15 days, the female is permitted to marry. If the female is over the age of 21, the males in her family do not need to be notified. Druze men notably may only take one wife, rather than the four wives permitted for other Islamic sects. Both men and women must request permission for divorce from the presiding sheikh, but women must wait four months to re-marry, unless her former husband passes away.

Personal Status Laws Conclusion:

In addition to the legal discrimination against women, women are all discriminated against within each confessional group's religious laws. Though these laws are enacted among each religious faith as well as within each sectarian group, there exists a consistent line of inequality between Lebanese men and women. Younger marriage ages for women than men, the prohibition or difficulties in women obtaining divorce, and child custody rights favoring men over women make life increasingly difficult for women trapped in violent situations. Women are legally disenfranchised, and additionally struggle to see a way out of violent situations due to financial restraints. Civil laws may not fully protect women against instances of violence and abuse, but they offer a degree of recourse that is currently still constricted for Lebanese women. KAFA drafted Bill 293 for this very purpose, to provide a means of protection, outside of their religious community, to women and children suffering from all forms of domestic violence. Though this bill passed after many revisions through amendments, this bill turned newly implemented law was an integral part of many of KAFA's campaigns engaging the state apparatus.

Civil and religious personal status laws are quite important in understanding the reality for Lebanese women fighting against gender-based violence. Through describing these laws, I established context surrounding KAFA's campaigns and shed light on KAFA's specific strategies for engaging women. Additionally, this background information is necessary for understanding Lebanese women and men's reactions to KAFA's campaigns. They are fundamental to understanding the source of gender-based

violence, the difficulties in remedying gender-based violence, and providing background on the socialization of Lebanese men and women regarding institutionalized inequality.

The Name and Shame Campaign:

Public and mediated reaction

Leading up to KAFA's Name and Shame Campaign, the religious community subjected Law 293 to intense backlash over its supposed interference with religious law. Both Sunni and Shi'a Islamic Clerics explicitly opposed the Law because it "violated the provisions of Islam" and risks, "disintegrating Muslim families in Lebanon and preventing children from being raised according to Islam, in addition to causing a conflict of competences between the concerned civil and Islamic courts."[49] The Islamic statement became a rallying cry for Muslim men in particular throughout Lebanon. In addition to these strong statements, the clerics also denounced the criminalization of marital rape, saying this concept does not exist in Islam, as well as raised questions regarding the issue of domestic violence itself. This backlash resulted in the removal of the article advocating for the criminalization of marital rape in Law 293. Hardly novel to Lebanese politics, religious leader involvement and the delicate balance of power between secular and religious courts prevented the implementation of stronger laws protecting women and families from domestic violence.

[49]Aziz, "Islamic Clerics Oppose Lebanese Law Protecting Abused Women - Al-Monitor."

The Name and Shame Campaign directly addressed the proposed amendment changes to draft law 293. KAFA and its supporters immediately recognized the dangers in amending the bill because it drastically reduced the amount of protection provided to a woman experiencing violence. The original bill also contained several needed articles providing protections that are not present in religious law. The Name and Shame Campaign came amidst a flurry of other activity, as the co-founder of KAFA noted after the passing of the bill with the problematic amendments, "We lobbied, we made a huge fuss around it, we staged a name-and-shame campaign."[50] Despite what some might consider a failure of the campaign, as it did not bring about the intended results, the campaign itself did incite reaction both from the 8MP's who were part of the sub-committee as well as contributed to intensified public reaction and protests.

The Name and Shame posters and commercials resulted in direct interference from the offices of several of the MP's on the sub-committee for draft law 293. As previously described, KAFA placed a short video stating the names and pictures of all eight MP's on Youtube, as well as ran the same video as a commercial on TV. KAFA also utilized the pictures and names from the video and created a banner and posters that they placed around the city, most notably on the back and inside of public busses. In my interview with Maya Ammar, she discussed how the banners were ripped from several busses by one or more of the MP's staff members. She also affirmed that KAFA's commercials were taken off air on several television stations after pressure from one or more MP's, although no names were given, a story that the Al-Akhbar journalist Layal

[50] Bramley, "Why Does Lebanese Bill on Domestic Violence Fail to Tackle Marital Rape?"

Haddad corroborated when she noted, "several members of parliament pressured television channels to refrain from running an advertisement promoting the law sponsored by KAFA ("enough" in Arabic).[…] Some media sources suggested that MP Samir Jisr, who belongs to the Future movement, asked the channel's management to stop broadcasting the advertisement."[51] Although Jisr denied these allegations, both the damaged posters and banners on the busses as well as the removal of KAFA's commercial point to interference with the campaign.

Social Media Reaction

KAFA put their Name and Shame Campaign video on YouTube on November 23, 2011. The video was viewed 5,139 times and received 20 "likes" and one "dislike." Unfortunately, there were no comments on the video, whereas the YouTube video did not receive any comments, KAFA's creation of a poster from the names and pictures in the YouTube video made three appearances in Facebook photos, all receiving varying amounts of attention.

The first photo appeared on Facebook on November 24, 2011. Though unfortunately there is not a "dislike" button, the photo received 56 likes, 25 comments, and 35 shares. KAFA contributed four of these comments. The other comments were broken down into five positive male comments by four male commentators, five positive female comments, and five negative male comments by three male commentators.

[51] {Citation}Haddad, "Fighting Domestic Violence in Lebanon."

The second photo appeared on Facebook on December 8, 2011. This photo showed the eight MPs with their names on a banner appearing on the back of a bus. Significant to the picture and its responses, KAFA noted, "We know that 2 posters appearing on buses and showing the pictures of the 8 MPs discussing the #protectwomen law were torn. And 6 buses were forbidden to circulate unless they removed the poster…We had hoped for a more tolerant response that at least would not prevent the message from reaching certain regions!!"[52] This photo received 28 likes, six comments, and two shares. Women made all four of the comments and all were positive in support of KAFA, but negative in reaction to the picture and KAFA's commentary.

The last photo appeared on Facebook on July 16, 2012. It is the exact same picture that appeared on Facebook on November 24, 2011. This picture received less commentary than the first appearance of the photo, but it still received 16 likes, seven comments, and 24 shares. Of these comments, there were two positive female comments, one negative male comment, one unclear male comment, and two male and one female comments appearing to joke about the MPs, though it was in a manner critical of their behavior.

[52] "KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation's... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook."

16 Days of Activism: The White Ribbon Campaign and the Internal Security Forces Campaign:

Public and Mediated Response

Every year since 2010, KAFA has participated in the 16 Days of Activism, with many of their campaigns launched during this period aimed at Lebanese men or traditionally masculine Lebanese groups. In 2012, KAFA targeted three University campuses where they conducted workshops and group activities designed to encourage men to pledge their support to stand against domestic violence. The year 2012 was important for KAFA with its proposed law against domestic and family violence in the process of Parliamentary approval. One of the foci of the campaign that year was to collect signatures on a petition supporting the proposed law. On the Haigazian University campus, over 100 men and women signed the petition. On the University of Balamand campus, over 210 men and women signed the petition. Lastly, on the Lebanese American University campus, more than 220 men and women signed the petition, with an additional 40 men and women signing the petition later in the day during a two-on-two basketball tournament that was part of KAFA's 16 Days of Activism activities.[53]

In addition to the informational sessions KAFA held during the 16 Days of Activism in 2012, the group launched campaign ads featuring Badih Abou Chakra. The following year, KAFA honored Chakra for these ads while launching its International Security Forces Campaign. The ISF Campaign, "We Have a Mission. If you're

[53] "The 'White Ribbon' Campaign in Universities-Lebanon | Engagingmen.net - A Gender Justice Information Network."

threatened, do not hesitate to call 112," in particular gained quite a bit of attention. During the launch, Lt. Col. Ziad Kayedbey pledged continued dedication to KAFA and victims of domestic abuse through the implementation of KAFA's courses on domestic violence, as well as the IDF police wearing white ribbons to show their support.[54] This campaign produced several interesting results: as of 2013 at the campaign's launch, 175 ISF policemen had been trained using KAFA's curriculum, and according to KAFA's President Zoya Rouhana, that number has increased to 300 trained ISF personnel as of March 8, 2015.[55] Additionally, KAFA implied through its use of a female ISF policewoman in one of its posters for the campaign that the use of female ISF members is important and necessary for combatting domestic violence. With the first induction of a women ISF member in 2001, and the ISF acceptance of 610 female applicants in 2012, Lebanese people are beginning to see the important connection between female ISF members and KAFA's campaigns against domestic violence.[56] A blog coming out of American University of Beirut that discusses gender issues in Lebanon and the wider Middle East notes:

> The female sergeants who are trained to address domestic violence represents a sympathizing authority figure of the same gender changing the former idea of the ISF as being oblivious and callous towards domestic violence. As a matter of fact, KAFA in collaboration with General Doctorate of the ISF launched a campaign on the 25th of November 2013 – International Day to End Violence against Women – titled: "We have a mission. If you're threatened, do not hesitate to call 112" (KAFA, n.p). The campaign is part of a program between the ISF and KAFA in order to reestablish the trust between the female victims and the ISF who now

[54] Taylor, "Women Rights Campaign Tackles Gender Roles | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."
[55] Urabi, "Tackling the Scourge of Domestic Violence in Lebanon."
[56] Staff, "Meet the First Woman to Join the Lebanese Security Forces."

> know how to respond to cases of gender based violence and take the necessary precautions to provide protection for the victim. […] Therefore, the female integration within the ISF has permitted the ISF to interfere within the family and divulge domestic issues as crimes.[57]

The growing number of ISF members trained by KAFA and the possibility for further integration of female ISF personnel into KAFA's campaign plan illustrate the already noticeable growth of the campaign and a future of possibilities.

Social Media Response

KAFA's video that they released on November 27, 2012 on YouTube featuring Badih Abou Chakra challenges dominant conceptions of masculinity that portray males as violent, aggressive, rich, and strong. This video received 1,740 views, 18 likes, and six dislikes. There were only two comments on the video, one coming from a male that himself challenged the conception of masculinity portrayed in the video and another coming from a female KAFA employee.

KAFA also released a video on YouTube for their ISF Campaign titled "We Have a Mission…" This film was put on YouTube on November 26, 2013 and received 2,254 views, 22 likes and one dislike. There was only one comment on this video, but the comment was positive from a male viewer.

On Facebook, KAFA's photos again received more response regarding its White Ribbon Campaigns than on its YouTube channel. For its general White Ribbon Campaign Cover photo posted on November 21, 2012, KAFA received 20 likes and four

[57] Seifeddine, "Women Across the Barrier by Muhieddine Labban."

shares. There were only three comments on the photo, with one coming from KAFA, but the two comments coming from one male were positive. Notably, his comments ask, "can we have more informaiton about this>?" and, "just want to participate and talk about this issue."[58]

For this same campaign, KAFA posted a photo on November 26, 2012 with two ISF members signing up to stand against domestic violence. The photo received 352 likes, 25 comments, and 183 shares. There were 11 positive comments from female respondents, one positive female comment that was confusing, one comment with a women tagged, three comments from female users that were positive but criticizing the government, two confusing comments from males, and one positive male response and one negative male response. This same photo was posted again on November 27, 2012 with ten likes, no shares and no further comments.

KAFA put up its poster with the male ISF member standing in front of a woman on November 25, 2013. This poster received 502 likes, 38 comments, and 214 shares. Of the comments, six were positive female comments made by five respondents. One woman commented twice with one negative and one positive comment, with both comments regarding government criticism. There were seven female responses given by six responders that were positive, but criticized the government. There were two positive male responses that were also government critiques, one male response that was unclear, and one negative response by a male that was also a government critique. KAFA also commented 13 times.

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[58] "KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation's... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation | Facebook."

KAFA's poster with the female ISF member standing in front of another woman was put up following the male ISF poster on November 27, 2013. This poster received 994 likes, 36 comments, and 271 Shares. The comments on the poster consisted of one comment made by KAFA, 17 female positive comments, two comments made by females but were unclear, one positive male comment, four positive comments made by females that were also critiquing the government, and two comments made by males that were also critiquing the government. When the poster was posted again on December 17, 2013, it received 161 likes, three comments, and 35 shares. A female responder made one positive comment with the other positive comment coming from a male Facebook user.

ENGAGING THE PUBLIC-ROULA YAACOUB AND MANAL ASSI

Roula Yaacoub and Manal Assi never met each other while they were alive. Leading seemingly different lives, their names have only been brought together after each woman's death at the hands of their abusive husbands. Both women were 33[59] years old at the time of their deaths, both women had all daughters, both women were beaten to death by their husbands, and the occurrences surrounding both Roula and Manal's deaths were marked with failure to act by either the state or the public. Roula Yaacoub died on July 7, 2013 from undetermined circumstances at the time. To date, Roula's former husband, Karam Bazzi, has been cleared of all involvement in the death of his now-deceased wife. Yet the circumstances of Roula's death are anything but clear, and both

[59] Some reports list Roula Yaacoub's as 31 years of age upon her death.

KAFA and Roula's family continued to demand answers even after the court found Bazzi not responsible for the death.[60] Final coroner reports stated that Roula died from a brain aneurism, yet Roula's family is convinced that her husband's abuse triggered the aneurism. Two months after her death, Roula's body was finally exhumed for the ongoing investigation at that time. The mother had requested the autopsy immediately after Roula's death, but her plea went unanswered. According to the mother and neighbors, Roula's husband regularly beat his wife and five daughters. Though the neighbors claimed to have tried to intervene in the abuse on the night of Roula's death, the husband supposedly refused until he asked for help when his wife became comatose.[61] Roula's mother and family speculate that certain measures were taken to cover up her death, including a forged doctor's report in addition to the refused autopsy.[62] With the dismissal of charges against Bazzi, Roula's family is left with little closure and fewer answers.

On February 4, 2014, Mohammad Nhaily bludgeoned his wife, Manal Assi, to death with a pressure cooker. Similar to numerous other instances of domestic abuse in Lebanon, the details of Manal's death are not quite clear. Some neighbors claimed that their marriage was a generally happy one until that deadly night, the culmination of smaller fights over Nhaily's new marriage to his second wife. Yet Manal's two daughters, ages 15 and 13, tell a different story. The oldest daughter recounted in an interview with *The Daily Star* newspaper only days after the murder of her mother how

[60] Nehme, "Teacher 'beaten to Death' by Her Husband | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."
[61] "Lebanese Woman Beaten to Death by Husband :: Beirut.com :: Beirut City Guide."
[62] Abou Jaoude, "Body of Domestic Violence Victim Exhumed | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."

the abuse had been ongoing since she was three years old. She affirmed to the newspaper that Manal had been beaten this severely before, including having her nose broken.

On the night of her death, Manal's husband beat her unconscious, and then continued to beat her as she lay bleeding and helpless on the floor. At some point during his violent attack upon his wife, Nhaily decided to call Manal's mother to come to her daughter as she lay dying. Though accounts vary, this story only grows more horrific as Nhaily locked Manal's mother and sister in the room with Manal for two hours. He refused to let them out for medical help, and blocked neighbors from entering into his house with a gun. Some neighbor's accounts state that they called the ISF during the deadly fight, but that the ISF refused to interfere in what they deemed a private matter.[63] Finally, neighbors and relatives of Manal living nearby broke into the house to get to Assi, while Nhaily gathered the rest of his family and fled.[64] Manal later died at the hospital after Nhaily tortured her for hours.

Engaging the Public Campaigns:

Current estimates in Lebanon place the death toll of women murdered from domestic violence at an average of one death per month.[65] This tentative number does not take into account the vastly greater number of women affected by physical,

[63] Nehme, "Teacher 'beaten to Death' by Her Husband | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."
[64] Ibid.
[65] Qiblawi, "Women Decry Lebanon's Domestic Violence Law - Al Jazeera English."

psychological, or sexual abuse in the country. These women's deaths have increasingly prompted the Lebanese public to bring to light the details and circumstances surrounding the horrible abuses taking place. The deaths like the two women above, Manal and Roula, inspired mass public reaction, including marches, protests, and various performances. These actions highlight the immediate need for more protections for women.

Though further protections for women, by way of judiciary intervention, are absolutely necessary, KAFA also emphasizes the need for preventative measures. Following the death of Roqaya Mounzer, the news website quoted Maya el- Ammar saying, "We don't need any more proof that women are the main victims of domestic violence, but we wait until women die to act about it."[66] Although the need for preventative measures in Lebanon is not new, recently KAFA has developed several interactive campaigns designed to elicit user responses, including both potential victims and potential witnesses of domestic violence. One of the campaigns, "A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride" was widely noted for its unique, yet quite shocking, approach to a social justice advertisement. The other campaign, Zalfa, utilizes an avatar to educate her viewers while allowing for further questions and viewer feedback.

"Driving Change…A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride":

[66] Benoist, "Roqaya Mounzer, Lebanon's Latest Victim of Domestic Violence."

Public and Mediated Response

The public response to this campaign was overwhelmingly positive. Although it did not result in protests, the advertisement was widely cited in various blogs, news websites, and advertisement databases. Out of 105 possible Google search hits on the main search engine and the news search engine, KAFA's taxi ride campaign was mentioned 20 times. The majority of these mentions were on various advertisement databases with 12 mentions. These databases predominantly were locations for people to connect and share interesting advertisement ideas. Though many of these databases only described the campaign, several praised the campaign for its unique approach to social justice advertising. Six different blogs mentioned the KAFA Taxi Ride, including a blog by the Lebanese Human Rights Center. Additionally, three news websites, albawaba, The Daily Star Lebanon, and the Huffington Post wrote stories about the advertisement campaign. Though none of the three news websites gave an opinion on the advertisement, the Huffington Post article provided contacts for information for help with domestic abuse situations.

Social Media Response

The Social Media Response to "A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride" received predominantly positive responses on Facebook and YouTube. The YouTube video posted on March 16, 2014 reached 6, 987 views, and received 23 likes and one dislike. Four users responded to the video, with two of the viewers sharing the advertisement on Google+ as well as positively commenting on the video, one viewer only sharing the video on Google+, and one viewer only giving a positive comment. Of these responders, two were males and two were marketing or consulting groups. On Facebook, a link to The Daily Star Lebanon's article on the taxi ride posted on May 19, 2014 had 157 likes, and 35 shares. Though Facebook states that it received five comments, there are 8 comments visible on the post. The comments on this post are extremely interesting, with one person in particular raising questions as to the integrity

Figure: 3.1



and authority of the KAFA organization (See Figure 3.1).[67] Though these comments will be addressed in the following chapter, it is necessary to point out that the negative comments were directed at the KAFA organization, but appeared to be in fervent support of women standing up against domestic violence. Overall, the link received two male comments critiquing KAFA, two positive female comments, two positive male comments, two neither negative nor positive comments that asks for more information from a male, and two comments from KAFA.

KAFA posted links to the taxi ride campaign on three other occasions. On May 15, 2014, the post received 122 likes, 54 shares and three comments. All three comments were positive from female responders. On May 13, 2015, the taxi ride post received 242 likes, 169 shares, and three comments. One male made a positive comment, three female tagged other Facebook users, and three female made a positive comment. The last time the video was posted was on August 7, 2014. This post received 108 likes, six comments, and 43 shares. Of the comments, four were positive comments from females and one was a negative comment from a female.

Zalfa:

Leading up to KAFA's 16 Days of Activism in 2014, the organization released several sneak peaks of Zalfa, growing anticipation for its new campaign. On November 25, KAFA finally posted Zalfa's introductory picture, simultaneously débuting Zalfa on

[67] ""The Idea Is Simple: The More Solidarity... - KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation."

Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LCBI) during the station's news bulletin.

In my interview with Maya Ammar, she noted that the KAFA organization is still small, unable to even find a place for all of their possible volunteers yet receiving a growing amount of calls for help to their organization. In light of the growing demand for help among Lebanese women, KAFA created the Zalfa avatar, which she discussed with Al Monitor, a news website, saying, "Women are often scared to file a claim, but speaking up early limits the risks, […] We hope that this approach will give them tools to pull through. Since January, 1,050 women have been supported by KAFA, which is much more than usual. We are overburdened, this is too much for a small center like ours."[68] Again encouraging the active engagement of the public, Zalfa provides tools for both the victims of domestic violence and the witnesses to these abuses to begin the process of stopping the violence. In addition to giving answers and legal advice to many common questions in situations of abuse, the campaign also encourages women to ask further questions through a messaging system at the end of Zalfa's discussions.

Public and Media Response

Zalfa's software literally allows for the avatar to speak for herself, something she has done in a variety of media. Perhaps most notably, LBCI introduced Zalfa on November 25, 2014 and featured Zalfa during its news bulletin between November 26 2014-December 10, 2014 (See Table: 3.1). LCBI posted all of these clips on their

[68] Massena, "Lebanese Women Not Safe despite Domestic Violence Law - Al-Monitor."

website, garnering further attention for the domestic violence. This paper will utilize a chart to illustrate the days Zalfa appeared on LCBI, the episode number, and the number of views the clip received on LCBI's website:

Table: 3.1 Zalfa Appearances on LCBI

11/26	11/27	11/28	11/29	11/30	12/1	12/2	12/3	12/4	12/5	12/6	12/7	12/8	12/9	12/10
Ep. 1	Ep. 2	Ep. 3	Ep. 4	Ep. 5	Ep. 6	Ep. 7	Ep. 8	Ep. 9	Ep. 10	Ep. 11	Ep. 12	Ep. 13	Ep. 14	Ep. 15
528 Views	379 Views	297 Views	362 Views	344 Views	408 Views	309 Views	275 Views	415 Views	325 Views	227 Views	332 Views	310 Views	312 Views	315 Views

In addition, to date (3/20/15), Zalfa has received mentions or articles from 9 major Arab news websites, it has been featured on the Women Economic Empowerment Portal and the popular Lebanese blog BlogBaladi and the Lebanese Center for Human Rights blog, as well as on the previously mentioned Al Monitor news website.

Social Media Response

KAFA has also featured Zalfa on its YouTube account and Facebook group. In the following Table: 3.2 are the dates KAFA posted each episode on YouTube, the episode number, and the number of views per each episode:

Table: 3.2: Zalfa Episodes on YouTube

12/5	Episode 1	187 Views
12/5	Episode 2	12 Views
12/5	Episode 3	9 Views
12/5	Episode 4	12 Views
12/5	Episode 5	6 Views
12/5	Episode 6	16 Views
12/5	Episode 7	9 Views
12/5	Episode 8	15 Views
12/5	Episode 9	6 Views
12/5	Episode 10	9 Views
12/5	Episode 11	26 Views
12/11	Episode 12	16 Views
12/11	Episode 13	11 Views
12/11	Episode 14	20 Views
12/11	Episode 15	16 Views

From the very first sneak peaks of Zalfa up until the present date (3/20/15) KAFA has posted 22 photos of Zalfa to its Facebook page. First, the information regarding these

photos will be broken down in Table: 3.3 into the categories of each photo's date of posting, the number of likes, the number of comments, and the number of shares. After this information, more detailed information will be given regarding two of these Zalfa photos.

Table: 3.3: Zalfa Photographs on KAFA's Facebook

Photo #	Date	Likes	Comments	Shares
Photo 1	11/20/14	388	23	3
Photo 2	11/24/14	430	16	3
Photo 3	11/24/14	718	35	136
Photo 4	11/24/14	147	8	2
Photo 5	11/24/14	153	-	29
Photo 6	11/25/14	751	20	88
Photo 7	11/27/14	104	2	4
Photo 8	11/28/14	186	6	31
Photo 9	12/1/14	375	8	107
Photo 10	12/2/14	127	7	6
Photo 11	12/3/14	14	1	-
Photo 12	12/4/14	104	5	7
Photo 13	12/5/14	210	6	19
Photo 14	12/5/14	1245	16	89
Photo 15	12/8/14	101	-	1
Photo 16	12/9/14	93	-	12
Photo 17	12/10/14	129	1	12
Photo 18	12/11/14	122	-	4
Photo 19	12/12/14	121	-	13
Photo 20	12/14/14	147	-	12
Photo 21	12/29/14	4144	36	44
Photo 22	1/2/15	343	2	2

For the purposes of this thesis, the following information will differentiate the gender of authors, and positive or negative reaction of the posts for Photos 3 and 6. These two photos were chosen because the Photo 3 is the first appearance of the figure Zalfa during her reveal, and Photo 6 is Zalfa introducing herself. As noted, Photo 3 received 718 likes, 35 comments, and 136 shares. Among these comments, 18 were from female respondents with positive feedback, one comment from a female with a positive response but critiquing gender-violence, one comment was indecipherable from a female, three responses were positive male comments, one comment was from a male user with a negative response, and KAFA made three comments. In Photo 6, there were 751 likes, 20 comments, and 88 shares. Nine of these comments were positive responses from female users, three of the comments were indecipherable comments from female responders, two of the comments were positive from male respondents, and three male respondents made five negative comments.

ENGAGING THE KAFALA SYSTEM-BARCOTAN DUPREE

On November 10, 2014, Barcotan Dupree leapt from her employer's building, shocking the people of Lebanon and demanding further conversation on the Kafala system. An onlooker caught the moment of her jump on tape, showing Dupree free falling with arms flailing onto the sidewalk. Dupree survived her jump, afterwards receiving care at the Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center. This jump that caught the country's attention came after

Dupree's employer beat her on multiple occasions.[69] Dupree had attempted an escape prior to her jump, but was forced to return to her employer because she had nowhere else to go. Though this moment was particularly shocking because the moment of the attempted suicide was caught on tape, Dupree's jump came amongst a spree of migrant domestic workers' attempted suicides or murders. Unfortunately, the jump became more of a spectacle than a demand for immediate policy change in Lebanon.

Engaging the Kafala System Campaigns:

KAFA's launched its most recent campaign "Raise Shawwa's Voice" on February 9, 2015 as part of its ongoing effort to battle systematic racism in Lebanon and to gain rights for Migrant Domestic Workers. This campaign, the newest of the campaigns discussed in this thesis, has yet to gain the same mediated traction as KAFA's other campaigns. Yet the events surrounding Raise Shawwa's Voice are notable for exemplifying the spectacle of Dupree's attempted suicide. The Raise Shawwa's Voice campaign will be discussed below, but I felt that two events, one taking place on March 16, 2015 and one taking place on March 19, 2015, were integral to the unfolding of Shawwa's campaign and demand attention in this thesis. On March 16, 2015, a domestic worker agency sent out an SMS message to several thousand cellphones on Mother's Day; the message advertised a special for Kenyan and Ethiopian nationalities of housekeepers. On March 19, 2015 a Bengali migrant domestic worker, Melika Begum, was found hanging by her employers. Her suicide followed three days of a hunger strike.

[69] Ayoub, "Suicide Attempt Highlights Plight of Lebanese Migrant Workers - Al-Monitor."

The following information will detail the responses on news websites, blogs, and social media sites that discuss all three events.

Media and Public Response

The campaign Raise Shawwa's Voice has garnered little media recognition to date (3/20/15). Beirut News Network, however, featured the campaign in its discussion of the migrant domestic workers' proposal for a syndicate to protect their rights. This was proposed on January 5, 2015, and denied by the Lebanese Labor Ministry on January 27. New laws have been proposed and submitted to the Cabinet, awaiting Parliamentary approval.[70] The connection made between KAFA's campaign and the organizing of migrant domestic workers illustrates the campaign's ability to take the voice of Shawwa and use it to spread the story of the other 200,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. Republiqué, an advertising agency, currently features the campaign on their website, though it is unclear if the agency itself helped to create the campaign.[71]

Social Media Response

KAFA put up Shawwa's photo twice on Facebook, as well as posting the video once. The first photo from February 9, 2015 received 175 likes, 13 shares and 17 comments. These comments in particular are difficult to categorize because there is an indication that several have been erased, and almost all comments enter into a debate regarding a case where a migrant domestic worker was accused of being responsible for

[70] S, "Shawwa."
[71] "Raise Shawwa's Voice - Kafa."

the death of a child. The second photo was posted on February 18, 2015 and received 289 likes, 29 comments, and 25 shares. These comments included subcomments, which lead to total of 77 documented comments. Of these comments, 46 were negative comments made by ten females, 25 positive comments were made by nine females, five positive comments were made by males, and one negative comment was made by a male. KAFA made two comments, two comments by females were not relevant to the post and one female tagged another person. The video was posted on February 6 and received 18,584 views, 330 likes, 37 comments, and 151 shares. Of these comments, six females made positive comments, two females made negative comments, two females made three negative comments, and one male gave a negative comment.

The feedback on Facebook prompted KAFA to issue a response via their website. The organization's response exudes an air of disappointment, noting the misunderstanding of human rights principles and the evident racism in the comments. KAFA outlines its commentary in four points: 1. Stating the campaign's goal to be a serious inquiry into the number of migrant domestic worker suicides, 2. Questioning the commentators directing anger toward individual migrant domestic workers instead of the larger Kafala system, 3. Challenging the validity of stories regarding individual migrant workers committing crimes that the commentators brought up as an excuse to not give these workers human rights, 4. Addressing those who reprimanded KAFA for prioritizing migrant domestic worker abuses. KAFA utilizes all four points to challenge accepted Lebanese knowledge regarding migrant domestic workers while prompting those responding negatively to the campaign to examine inner biases.

Little more than a month after KAFA launched its Raise Shawwa's Voice campaign, a short SMS message sent a reminder to the people of Lebanon as to why conversations regarding migrant domestic workers rights remain imperative. This message of an agency offering a discount on domestic workers depending on their nationality went out to several thousand people on Lebanese Mother's Day. Outrage erupted in the country as the SMS message went viral, including a feature on KAFA's Facebook website.

As the SMS message spread across Lebanon, four news websites discussed the SMS message, while I was able to find six blog posts written about the message. All ten various websites condemned the message. Several of these sources also noted that the Lebanese Labor Minister, Sejaan Azi, stated that the Ministry was searching for the agency and that it would be shut down if found. He called the message, "an insult to human rights and dignity."[72] The widespread outrage apparently prompted the agency to send out an apology message.[73]

Many of KAFA's Facebook viewers stated that the apology was not enough and demanded that the agency be shut down, corresponding with the majority of viewers' condemning attitude to KAFA's Facebook post asking its viewers whether or not this SMS was normal. This post, with the photo of the original SMS message, received 383 likes, 183 comments, and 462 shares. Of these comments, 24 females commented positively, zero females commented negatively, five males commented positively with

[72] "Lebanese Ad."
[73] "Pour La Fête Des Mères, Offrez-Lui... Une Bonne."

seven comments, two men commented negatively, two men made jokes on the post, three males made five posts tagging others on the photo, and one female made a comment tagging others on the photo.

Four days following the widespread Lebanese anger after the migrant worker agency sent out its SMS message, another migrant domestic worker tragically committed suicide. Her name was Melika Begum, and though the details surrounding the suicide are still unclear, currently what is known is that she was from Bangladesh and she was on a food strike for three days leading up to her suicide. Melika wanted to go home and see her children, a request that was denied her. She committed suicide in the city of Tripoli in the home of her employers, a husband and wife with six children.[74] Few news websites or blogs have given this story attention, with LBCI being the primary source regarding the suicide. LBCI's interview and story appear to have been picked up by approximately three other Arabic- speaking news websites in the three days following the suicide. One blogger, My Beirut Chronicles, wrote a scathing review of both the events surrounding the suicide and the lack of discussion following Melika's death. The Annahar news website also wrote a piece on the suicide on March 19, 2014, which KAFA put up on its Facebook group page.

The following analysis will discuss this news article from Annahar's website in an attempt to place the previous conversation on reactions to migrant domestic worker abuses in Lebanon in context. KAFA posted the article on March 21, 2015 and the post

[74] "North Lebanon Maid Was on Hunger Strike before Suicide: Ministry | News , Lebanon News | THE DAILY STAR."

received 188 likes, 53 comments and 25 shares within a little more than 24 hours time. The majority of the comments indicate that the responders viewed the article as blaming the family for the worker's suicide. Though several of the comments were apologetic in nature regarding both sides of the Kafala system, many of the comments simultaneously condemned any blame placed on the family while also responding negatively to the situation as a whole. Of these comments, 35 females responded negatively in 46 comments, five females made confusing comments with two of these females commenting on another issue off the topic, three females tagged other people, with one of those tagged responding with a joke, seven males responded positively in 11 comments, and three males responded negatively in six comments.

CONCLUSION

Though it is possible to analyze KAFA's campaigns engaging the state apparatus, the public, and the Kafala system in an isolationist manner, this chapter attempted to embed KAFA's engagement in real world situations. Utilizing particular characteristics from the stories of Roqaya Mounzer, Roula Yaacoub, Manal Assi, Barcotan Dupree, and Melika Begum, I constructed this chapter to show the urgency in KAFA's message. The campaigns are designed to be relevant to the viewer, bringing to light deep biases and unchallenged thought processes that have real world consequences. Matching these stories with KAFA's various campaign strategies, I attempted to illustrate the discernable outcomes of several of KAFA's campaign platforms. Utilizing news websites, blogs, and Facebook and YouTube viewer responses when available, I created a system of analysis

that yields a degree of explanatory feedback. Several of the campaigns, primarily those engaging the state structure, resulted in real world results and mobilization of bodies. Other campaigns primarily incited technologically based feedback, but this type of feedback does not preclude mobilization. Though this chapter discusses each campaign strategy separately in their own context, it provides results for analysis and cross-campaign analysis in the following section.

Chapter 4: Reactions Across Campaigns: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly

The complications with Lebanese identity most certainly are a factor in women's rights groups, including the KAFA organization. In order to mobilize, KAFA requires collective rather than individual strategies for involvement. This would require women to set aside political, religious, and socio-economic identifiers in order to prioritize gender identity within the group. KAFA in fact describes the organization in such terms, "[KAFA] is a feminist, secular, Lebanese, non-profit, non-governmental civil society organization." Though this idea is phenomenal in theory, similar to Frasier's idea of the counter public, it is difficult to integrate into the reality of Lebanese society. On the most basic level, women are expected to be loyal to their family, and then to their community. This community is often their religious sect, which is also part of a larger countrywide confessional group. Because of the current kin-based community structures in Lebanon, women are forced to be loyal not only to this group structure, but also to rely on it for support. The Lebanese Civil War further engrained these confessional lines into the fabric of Lebanon's society, creating distance between women of different sectarian groups.

Before discussing the implications of identity divisions between KAFA's supporters and how these might affect KAFA's future goals in the Conclusion of this thesis, Chapter 3 will illustrate how identity divisions unfold in the form of responses to KAFA's Campaigns. This chapter will put the previous chapter's campaign results in

conversation with each other, particularly focusing on the ratios of positive to negative female and male comments across campaigns. Once this information is established, I will place the results in a Lebanese societal context to analyze the reasons for the results. Though this information is certainly not definitively conclusive, it offers an interesting perspective into documented Lebanese public opinion in a partially public, partially private social media space.

The following chapter utilizes public responses to KAFA's campaigns, showing women's rights groups' difficulties in developing a unified identity or platform. The construction of Modern Lebanon through its confessional-based system continues to dictate many aspects of Lebanese society, in seen and unseen ways. The further stratification of society following the Lebanese Civil War intensified the already prevalent kin-based community structure that predominates the Middle East. As a result, women find their primary identities to belong to a communal system, one that is ever-changing depending on locality and relation to the other at a given time. This communal system is itself funneled through notions of patriarchy. Because the state often hands over personal status laws to the varying communities, women are deprived of certain rights that go against the communities' religious norms or sets of beliefs. Without the women's ability to seek recourse outside of communal boundaries, they are forced to rely on familial or community members for assistance. Additionally, the state's reliance on the sub-national communities shows the close relation between the two structures, both structures trying to maintain mutually beneficial relations. A further breakdown in protection for women occurs along similar lines when groups that represent women are

doing so at the behest of the state and along political lines. Oftentimes these groups only reinforce the current patriarchal structure and primarily appeal to upper class and elite groups of women. All of these structures rely upon what Suad Joseph calls "Patron/client" relationships that privilege males due to their pool of resources that result from existing as heads of family and heads of the political system.[75] Women's needs are disregarded when they complicate religious-political relations between groups. Without safeguards from the state, women must create their own protective structures through women's rights organizational efforts.

Historically in Lebanon, women have forfeited their progress in women's rights when there is an existential threat to their communities' nationalist or primary confessional identity; yet at the same time, many Middle Eastern women press for women's rights advocates to utilize the construct of nationalism as an emancipatory tool. To use nationalism as an emancipatory framework for Middle Eastern women necessitates a breaking free of the traditional conceptions of citizenship wrapped up with patriarchy. It would necessarily mean that women could gain equality in political and societal spheres. Moreover, this use of nationalism would stand in confrontation to the historical predominance of nationalism before women's rights. In a region that was forced into certain nationalist constructs following the end of World War I and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, women coming together under a Lebanese national identity allows for unification atypical of Lebanese sectarian society.

[75] Joseph, "Gender and Citizenship in Middle Eastern States." pg. 9

Yet for the very reasons that nationalism as an emancipatory framework could be a powerful front for Lebanese women, it inherently prioritizes Lebanese females rather than all females living in Lebanon. A critique that was not noted in the literature review or introductory section of this paper, Lebanese female nationalism poses the dangerous threat of reproducing, in both evident and passive forms, patriarchy on other women. Unfortunately, there is often a hierarchy of patriarchal reproduction, ranging from disparities in socioeconomic stature, educational level, and differences in ethnicity. As previously noted, this type of patriarchal reproduction is evidenced through the reports of migrant domestic worker abuse predominantly committed by the Madame of the household. Reproducing the systematic violence that women experience at the hands of men, the Madame physically and psychologically abuses the employee. Fermo-Fontan gives an excellent example of this when discussing the head of an "influential women's advocacy organization" responding to the author questioning her employment of a young Ethiopian girl. [76] The head of the organization insists that the employment of the 12-15 year old girl actually benefits the girl because her employment is better in contrast to other work the girl could be doing in Lebanon. This warped perspective of determining who has access to feminism or equality and and how to approach these issues in Lebanese society appears to be a prevalent, rather than isolated, problem throughout the country. The woman's indifference to challenging the modern day slave situation as a whole and instead rationalizing her comparatively positive use of a system of human

[76] Firmo-Fonton, "Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television: A Case Study of Al-Manar TV and the Hezbollah Women's Association." pg. 172-173

trafficking begs the question of whether or not this woman, and others like her, are interested in women's rights for full equality or only to provide themselves with a certain amount of comfort. Moreover, this type of comfortable feminism is problematic because it is only possible for the elite or the wealthy with access to resources.

In addition to both Lebanese men and women raising the question of who deserves access to equality and women's rights, I came across many comments in my research that asked the organization KAFA why they even undertook the issue of domestic worker's rights. One notable example illustrated this point with clarity (See: Figure 4.1). Commenting on KAFA's most recent campaign, Raise Shawwa's Voice, this male commentator responded:

Figure: 4.1



Additionally, the issue of collective identity plays an important part in the organizing and supporting of women's rights. C. Kelly and S. Breinlinger note that a motivating factor in who participates in group-action is a person's social identity, meaning her or his belonging to a certain group. A social identity may be achieved through two different paths, either individual or collective strategies, individual mobility or social change. Individual mobility relies on the success of the individual through each

person's own unique characteristics and capabilities. This type of strategy would result in the individual serving as a role model for future generations to emulate. Social change strategies on the other hand necessitate a group response in order to bring structural change while relying on identification and solidarity with other women. This theory notes that the difference between someone choosing the individual verses the group strategy depended on the person's level of identification with a group: "Individuals who identity only weakly with their group might be more likely to engage in individual action in trying to improve their personal status."[77] This study found that women's identification with other members of their gender was highly important in determining each woman's level of participation in an activist group. Additionally, women who identified in particular as having an activist identity, a sense of being and doing in relation to the group, were more likely to continue participating in the long run in group activities.[78]

Lebanese history illustrates the inherent boundary divisions resulting from the country's confessional-based political system, ultimately creating additional obstacles of identity divisions for women attempting to build a women's rights movement. Regardless of these differences, Lebanese women have their national identity to rely on to create cohesion within such a group as KAFA. Yet the previously stated difficulties with national identity prompting racism directed at migrants also problematizes a women's rights movements. Despite the problems KAFA faces for group cohesion, the common gender identity may be enough to form lasting bonds, and motivate those who

[77] Kelly and Breinlinger, "Identity and Injustice." pg. 54
[78] Ibid. pg. 54

characterize themselves with an activist identity to dedicate themselves to lasting and meaningful action.

The following chapter discusses what these identity divisions among KAFA supporters look like, specifically breaking down user responses to KAFA's Campaigns according to male and female gender identities. I have additionally compiled this information into data tables, listed in the Appendix as Tables 4:1, 4:2, and 4:3. Though religious identity is not always clear among these responses, KAFA's campaign strategies and Lebanese self-identification also allow for discussion regarding Lebanese nationalist identity and the response to the 'outsider'.

I would like to acknowledge the limitations that come along with this specific type of analysis, particularly the restricted audience accessibility on both YouTube and Facebook. Additionally, the comments on both YouTube and Facebook indicate that the user actively sought out the group KAFA, likely indicating the user's strong favor or dislike of the group and its campaigns. As evidenced by my information provided in the previous chapter, the number of comments the page received and the number of comments I analyzed frequently do not match up. It is necessary to note that I analyzed all comments that were permitted for public viewing. While I cannot completely discern the reason for not having access to view all comments, it is likely a result of Facebook's privacy settings. Also, the numbers of comments may not match up because Facebook may only count the main comment in its numbers, and not the subsequent replies to each comment. Lastly, this chapter will attempt to understand the theoretical and real world positioning of KAFA within Lebanese and the wider Middle Eastern women's rights

conversation, discussing the possibility for the group to create a lasting women's rights movement.

DISCUSSION:

PUBLIC AND MEDIA RESPONSES

Overall, KAFA's strategies of engaging the state apparatus and engaging the public incited the most widespread on-the-ground response and coverage. Both the Name and Shame Campaign and the ISF Campaigns resulted in intensified public participation by women and men alike. It is necessary to note, however, that although these campaigns inspired further protests, demonstrations, and petition-signing, both the Internal Security Forces campaign and the Name and Shame campaign were part of KAFA's larger push to pass Law 293. More than KAFA's other campaigns that attempt to raise awareness for certain issues, its strategies for engaging the state apparatus had a specific and tangible end-goal. This drove the public to participate in a way that allowed them to see the results of the participation, while also providing a particular timeline for involvement. I would theorize that the structured nature of these campaigns provided a degree of encouragement for KAFA's participants due to the possibility for instant gratification (success in the campaign), and inspired those who would not normally participate to take more of an active position within the organization.

KAFA's strategies for engaging the public sphere also garnered a large amount of media attention. Its A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign received widespread coverage in both Arab and English news websites, while several blogs also featured this

story. The results of my analysis show that this campaign in isolation did indeed garner the most media attention. Though the campaigns in the engaging the public sphere section also received quite a bit of media attention, these campaigns were part of KAFA's wider attempts to pass Law 293. The Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign was instead part of KAFA's attempts to raise public awareness for domestic violence and challenge witnesses to intervene when possible.

As stated in the name of the campaign, this taxi ride was indeed shocking, and every media or public response to the video highlighted this fact. Arguably, it is this spectacle of shock that incited much of the attention given to the video. Though this video was jarring, it did not contain graphic imagery like several of KAFA's other campaigns. The lack of violent imagery may account for why the video is so popular: audiences desire shock value without exposure to disturbing images. Though Sontag notes that people do view pictures for their often times grotesque and violent imagery that serve as spectacle, she also notes that there is a point where the audience becomes fatigued with violent imagery. This would explain the widespread use of KAFA's shocking video that allows the viewer the delicate balance between experiencing the violent world of domestic abuse and maintaining distance from some of its most disturbing results. As Sontag notes, "Wherever people feel safe-this was her bitter, self-accusing point-they will be indifferent."[79] Additionally, when audiences are exposed to something horrific, but do not have access to recourse to alleviate the horror of the situation, they become apathetic. KAFA's taxi campaign for the viewer presents itself as

[79] Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*. pg. 100

a tolerable situation to watch, preventing the viewer from emotionally shutting down in fear, while also presenting the viewer with an option of how to actively change the situation of domestic violence. In doing so, this campaign presents an opportunity for a digestible experience with domestic violence that may create tangible action. Though it is debatable whether or not domestic violence should be packaged in a video that an audience could view without having a deep fear aroused within them, KAFA offers many other campaigns and teaching materials that do not shy away from the realities of gender based violence.

Yet for all the positive possibilities this campaign may produce it is also important to challenge the way KAFA created the video. Because the premise of the video requires randomness in order to achieve undirected reactions, KAFA had no idea whether the women in the cab had previously been exposed or directly experienced gender-based violence. If any of these women were victims of violence, this video very well may have triggered trauma. This sheds further light on the difficulty in creating campaigns against gender-violence; the unfortunate reality of social justice is that it is very difficult to mobilize groups to resist oppression. Often, groups find it necessary to utilize shock-value and spectacle to garner attention of the masses to produce change. Yet at the same time the group finds it necessary to use shock and spectacle, questions are raised as to whom these tactics could hurt in the process, and whether the accidental pain caused to some is a necessary sacrifice to create lasting safety for others.

Additionally, the previous chapter noted an interesting comment on the A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride's Facebook post. The comment, accusing KAFA of not doing

anything for the commentator's friend who was in a situation of domestic abuse, highlighted the boundaries and difficulties KAFA faces when battling domestic violence. The woman discussed apparently was either not able to or not willing to reach out herself to KAFA, making it difficult for the organization to take action. Also, other commentators pointed out that short of KAFA going in and taking the women out of her home, KAFA possessed little ability to intervene in this particular situation. The Facebook comment showed the frustration on both ends of the conversation as a witness of the violence pleaded for help and KAFA was unable to take further action at the time. This situation exemplifies the need for legal structures and intervention programs to step in to help victims of abuse when KAFA is limited in its options.

The Zalfa campaign also received quite a bit of media coverage, mainly due to LBCI featuring it on its television channel during the 16 Days of Activism in Lebanon. LBCI also put the videos on its website, while KAFA placed the videos on YouTube and the pictures of Zalfa's information on Facebook. It is difficult to tell the number of viewers Zalfa reached because this thesis does not have the data for LBCI viewership during the campaign period. Yet the compiled analysis illustrates that every Zalfa video received at leaves 200 or more views, with some photos on Facebook also reaching up to 4000+ viewer likes. These numbers also have no way of accounting for the number of victims of violence that KAFA's photos with Zalfa's information reach through the organization's website, although Maya Ammar noted that Zalfa reached approximately 500,000 Facebook users. As previously noted, Ammar stated that Zalfa was designed to help higher numbers of people than perhaps KAFA is currently equipped to undertake in

its office alone; additionally, Zalfa's ability to communicate with women in a more personalized way than text alone, but more private interaction than an interaction with a human, offers new possibilities for battling gender-based violence. Though there exists little scholarship written on the use of avatars on media acting between the producer of the avatar and its audience, this paper found no theoretical basis for the use of avatars in social justice or human rights campaigns. Yet for the purpose of this thesis, the study "Online Consumer Trust and Live Help Interfaces-The Effects of Text-to-Speech Voice technology and Three-Dimensional Avatars" provides a degree of clarity to the possible effects of Zalfa on her audience.[80]

Hypothetically, consumer interaction with both avatars and/or voice to text speech technology increased the consumer's belief in the competency of the customer service representative it was interacting with, as well as the emotional connection with the customer service representative. Additionally, "increasing perceived levels of social presence, which is defined as the extent to which an individual physiologically perceives other people to be physically present when interacting with them (Short et. Al., 1976. Gefen and Straub (2003) demonstrated that social presence can affect consumer trust."[81] The results of the study showed that the subjects did indeed perceive the customer service representative assisting them through text to speech voice technology as more trustworthy than when the subject simply read the text. Though the study originally hypothesized increased trust between the subject and the representative through an avatar

[80] Lingyun QiuBenbasat, "Online Consumer Trust and Live Help Interfaces." pg. 81
[81] Ibid. pg. 81

giving increased social cues, the study did not find evidence to support this claim. The study believes the lack of empirical evidence showing the benefit of avatars can likely be attributed to several factors, including the poor quality of the avatars in the experiment. Though this study cannot directly correlate trust with experience with the avatar Zalfa, it provides hypothetical theories as to her benefits. The study indicates that a voice speaking information is trust worthier than text written on a page.

With Zalfa coming to life in various media, including a full-sized scale of Zalfa on LBTI, it is conceivable that Zalfa's voice interaction with her viewers both enhances their trust of this figure while also creating a degree of personal connection not found between a person and text. Additionally, it would be beneficial to conduct research on the extent of viewer trust regarding the information as well as psychological trust that Zalfa may or may not provide. To my knowledge, Zalfa is one of the first of her kind as an avatar providing information for a human rights organization. She is an extremely interesting figure to study, given the sensitive information she must relay to an audience that could be in danger if this audience instead reached out to real humans.

Though it is difficult to compare analysis across KAFA's campaigns concretely, to date, Raise Shawwa's Voice has received the least media and public response, while prompting the highest number of negative responses. Across all of the other campaign strategies, there were only two negative female responses directed at KAFA or its fight against gender based violence. One of these responses was a comment on the poster with the male ISF member standing in front of a woman, and the other comment was criticizing the A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride for the way it conducted the video. There

were 15 other comments that females made that critiqued the government or KAFA but supported the idea of the campaign itself, with seven of these comments concentrated again on the photo with the male ISF member standing in front of a woman. While these comments in general questioned the reality of the ISF helping women, many maintained the hope for this idealized photo to become a reality in Lebanon. In sharp contrast, KAFA's Raise Shawwa's Voice and the two subsequent situations, the SMS messaging scandal and the suicide of the migrant domestic worker Melika Bergum, received an overwhelming amount of negative feedback from females. KAFA's article on Melika Bergum received zero positive responses from females and 46 negative responses from 36 female Facebook users. It is interesting to note that Melika's video prompted the highest number of male (seven males commenting 11 times) support of any of KAFA's campaign posts on Facebook. Though it was not the highest number of males commenting on a photo proportionally, this post is the only one where more men than women showed support for KAFA's campaign strategies. Additionally, the male responses to the three migrant domestic worker campaigns and situations received the highest percentages of positive male comments, except for one, among all posts receiving 5 or more total comments.

KAFA's campaign strategies for raising awareness regarding the devastating problems with the Kafala system in Lebanon illustrate an interesting pattern of public interest, spectacle, and racism. KAFA released its Raise Shawwa's Voice campaign in February of 2015. This campaign received positive feedback from advertisement agencies and forums regarding the form of the campaign and its message. Yet the

Lebanese public did not respond so favorably, as the analysis done on KAFA's Facebook page illustrates. While a portion of the Lebanese followers of KAFA's Facebook page do support rights for domestic workers, many demonstrated a false knowledge of migrant domestic worker abuses and a disagreement with the campaign. Interestingly, while this thesis was being written, two events occurred in Lebanon that gave further insight into the negative reception of Shawwa's campaign. On Lebanese Mother's Day in March of 2015, an agency that provides housekeepers in Lebanon sent out an SMS message to several thousand Lebanese people via their cellphones. This message advertised a special offer of a reduced rate for housekeepers of Ethiopian and Kenyan nationalities. The Lebanese public, and KAFA's Facebook page followers reacted with outrage. KAFA's post on the message received 24 positive female responses, zero negative female responses, seven positive responses from five males, and only two negative responses from males. Despite what appeared to be a positive turn for KAFA's campaign against migrant domestic worker abuses, another domestic migrant worker's suicide, Melika Begum, four days after the text was sent out proved the positive response to be short lived. The day following Melika's suicide, KAFA posted an article critiquing the Kafala system for Melika's death. KAFA's followers reacted with outrage, claiming the article unfairly blamed the employer family for Melika's death, with many of the commentators again using this post as a chance to voice their grievances with migrant domestic workers.

These latest sequences of events, beginning with KAFA's launch of Raise Shawwa's Voice and ending with the suicide of Melika Begum, reveal a deep-seated

racism prevalent in Lebanese society. Even many of the people who condemn the modern day slavery system in Lebanon cannot resist taking a moment to complain about her or his own bad experiences with a migrant domestic worker. The responses to KAFA's Shawwa campaign were so disturbingly egregious that the KAFA organization deemed it necessary to post a four-point response on its website condemning the Facebook comments and refuting the commentators' points. Perhaps most notable is KAFA's final point of the four, which responds to the comments asking why KAFA even takes up the abuses of domestic migrant workers in the first place. These comments, implying the lack of value many Lebanese place on the rights and the very lives of migrant domestic workers, prompted KAFA to pose the question of if these workers mean so little, why do so many Lebanese pay so much money and rely on the workers so heavily? Despite the critique that these workers' lives should matter despite what they can for their Lebanese employers, KAFA challenged those opposing rights for migrant domestic workers to analyze her or his own racism.

The Lebanese Public's outrage over the SMS text message gave the appearance that perhaps some of the former critics of Shawwa's campaign may have reevaluated their stance, or that there was more anti-racist and human trafficking sentiment within Lebanon than previously assumed. Despite these initial hopes, only one blogger among all the media and social media feedback that day saw through the façade of empathy. The following is an excerpt from Claude el Khal's piece, "What? There's Human Trade in Lebanon" on the blog My Beirut Chronicles:

> "Someone took a screenshot and posted it on social media. The photo went viral and in a few hours it became the talk of the nation. Lebanon woke up to a harsh reality: in this very civilized country of ours, housemaids are treated like products.
>
> Shock. Outrage. Ya mama.
>
> Strangely, most of the people that expressed their disbelief on social media have a housemaid and know perfectly how this whole business works. They know that these women and these girls are not allowed to keep their passport. They know how they are treated from the moment they land in our beautiful international airport until the moment they leave, if they ever do. They know about the racism, the abuse, the suicides.
>
> They know of the companies that make money out of this human trade. They had to deal with one them to get their own maid, didn't they? They most probably know about the different websites and Facebook pages that advertise these companies' services, some in the most horrendous way, like posting a picture of these workers passports, in complete violation of their privacy.
>
> Most of these people were living in Lebanon when, a few years ago, a domestic worker called Alem Dechasa killed herself. They expressed the same outrage back then. Then forgot all about it.
>
> To be fair, it was on March 14 2012. An eternity by Lebanese standards.
>
> Today, the fair citizens of Lebanon are in shock. Tomorrow they'll forget. Until the next SMS or the next suicide.[82]

This blog simultaneously pointed out the hypocrisy of many of those claiming shock, and the short memory span of the Lebanese people. Many of the comments on Shawwa's campaign boasted of how well she or he treated her or his domestic migrant worker. In all of the analysis, I did not come across one comment from a person admitting to personally abusing their housekeeper in some way. Yet even these people

[82] Khal, "My Beirut Chronicles," March 16, 2015.

claiming to treat their housekeepers with kindness, only to be taken advantage of later, had to attain the migrant domestic worker from some agency. Choosing to maintain a blind eye when it came to personally hiring a migrant worker in a system perpetuating modern day slavery, these people instead cry foul when the nature of the Kafala system comes to light in a painfully obvious manner.

Moreover, the events surrounding the SMS text message came together in a form of spectacle. The obvious problems with the text message combined with the shock value it entailed, allowed even mildly racist Lebanese to condemn the message as outrageous. Additionally, the fury that swept Lebanon on Mother's Day provided a means of garnering attention for those supposedly shocked with the message. The SMS message allowed Lebanese to feign outrage over the racism in this message without risking any additional action or personal involvement with the situation. Though some Lebanese certainly did care and their reaction resulted in the Lebanese Ministry of Labor supposedly shutting down the agency that was the original source of the message, many others reacted to the SMS as a fad. Melika Begum's suicide that followed the SMS message four days later illustrated the vast difference between support for an attention-garnering fad and a tragedy that necessitates lasting and dedicated attention. The same blogger as previously cited, Claud el Khal, is the only blogger to date that addressed this suicide:

> There we go again. Another migrant domestic worker committed suicide. It happened yesterday, in Tripoli, Lebanon's largest northern city.
>
> But of course, no one talked about it. Social media's usual criers didn't

> shed a tear. Didn't make a sound. Didn't write a word. Why bother? There was no shocking SMS advert sent to their phones. The news didn't create the buzz on the net. So in the grand tradition of Lebanese indignation, where human misery is used to promote our own ego on social media, this suicide story is just another bore. The weekend is coming, and selfies in restaurants are far more important.
>
> No buzz no cries.
>
> What's even more disturbing is that not many Lebanese media outlets reported Malika Begum's suicide. Not even the ones claiming to be the champions of Human Rights." [83]

KAFA's post about Melika Begum's death received zero positive female comments, and 46 devastatingly negative female comments. These three instances, serving as a microcosm for the broader issues with the Lebanese Kafala system, illustrate that racism cannot be wiped out by a moment of spectacle, that activism is acceptable when it does not require self-analysis, and that even those who claim to support feminist principles do not necessarily support equality for everyone, or even all females in Lebanon. Reading Nancy Frasier's idea of a counter public and the necessary correction for blind-spots in feminism regarding differences in socio-economic, religious, as well as ethnic and nationalist identities, highlights the identity problems that so many feminist or women's rights groups face. Inherent differences in identity among feminists possess the potential to derail egalitarian goals for dismantling patriarchy. This illustrates why Frasier's theory that itself confronts the issues with Habermas' public space is not enough given the reality of those participating in women's rights organizations. KAFA's followers on Facebook likely support women's rights, though this may not always be the

[83] Khal, "My Beirut Chronicles," March 20, 2015.

case for a woman joining women's rights Facebook group. Yet what becomes painfully obvious through my analysis is that these women want women's rights, but only for those whom they deem worthy. When women's rights for domestic migrant workers challenge the Lebanese women's social preconceptions, monetary comfort, or do not obviously or directly benefit Lebanese women, then this group of Lebanese women revert to perpetuating the patriarchal structure back on migrant domestic workers. KAFA provided a necessary and powerful response to both the female and male commentators negatively responding to the Shawwa campaign, refusing to let the bigotry go unchecked. While KAFA could have posted this response on its Facebook page, the response is a start to battling social stratification within the organization.

In Lebanon, raising awareness of migrant domestic worker abuses, and even the elimination of racism will not be enough to create an egalitarian society; instead, all women must stop any association with the current Kafala System. Despite many employers' attempts to justify the use of migrant domestic workers, whether they believe they are 'civilizing' the worker or providing the worker with a better opportunity than could be found elsewhere, any association with the Kafala system is tantamount to support for it. Whether or not women employers physically or psychologically abuse their worker, they are still participating in the larger Kafala structure that degrades and systematically disenfranchises every foreign domestic worker.

The employment of a migrant domestic worker does not exist in isolation from the larger Kafala network. In order for the network to function properly, there must be domestic worker agencies, recruitment agencies in these women's home countries,

General Security officers, and detention centers. All of these parts possess a dangerous function in addition to the Madame, or the female head of household, who consistently proves the biggest threat to migrant domestic workers within the home. The Madame may beat the worker, lock her up, overwork her, or starve her. The husband or sons in the household, or other male family members or friends of the employers may rape the worker.

Many of these issues, much like domestic violence against Lebanese women, go underreported because of the shame it would bring on the employing family and the further fear of retribution against the worker. Naifa Niska Dalalti was found hanging in her employer's house, dead at the age of 23.[84] She was six months pregnant. This story is one of countless stories without a proper ending; English al-Akhbar reported on the story, giving no further explanation. Several comments in the comment section of this news website posed the question begging to be answered, how did she become pregnant when she was locked away in a home of her employers? Why did she commit suicide?

Many other migrant domestic workers run away from their employers' home to avoid the fate of Naifa. Once they have escaped, they force an entire new set of potential abuses. If the worker is able to run away with her visa, she may find another worker with a kinder employer. Or, she may be able to return to her real home. If the worker is unable to obtain her visa, a very common situation because the employing family usually holds its worker's visa, the General Security may take the woman. Once General Security has a woman in its possession, she may be sent to a detention center. These detention centers

[84] "Pregnant Domestic Worker Hangs Self in Lebanon."

are often "overcrowded cells under poor conditions."[85] According to the Article "Female Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon-a case of 'contract slavery'?" the center in El Chebaak was built to hold 200 women, but routinely held around 600 at a time. Following detention, migrant domestic workers rarely find justice. Lebanese courts almost never rule in favor of these workers.

Migrant domestic workers might be kept prisoner in the home of their employers, but, "Workers cannot leave the house for fear they may be caught by the police or General Security and arrested or imprisoned because they are not carrying their identity papers. There is a tacit expectation that being detailed in Lebanon by the security forces will likely be accompanied by some form of physical or even sexual abuse."[86] Sometimes, the women who are caught by the General Security without papers will instead by returned to their employers' homes or to domestic worker agencies. Such was the case with Alem Dechasa-Desisa, who committed suicide on March 14, 2012. LBCI aired a video on March 8, showing the events that occurred on February 24, 2012 leading up to Alema's death. In this chilling video, the brother of the owner of the recruiting agency that brought Alema to Lebanon, Ali Mahfouz, with the help of another man drags Alema from the street and literally forces her against her will into a car. She is crumpled up and stuffed, seemingly a rag-doll, into the men's car, as on-lookers do nothing to stop the abuse. Mahfouz claimed to be returning Alema to her country due to her mental health problems. Alema was taken to detention center, and then committed suicide at the

[85] Jureidini and Moukarbel, "Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon." pg. 598
[86] Ibid. pg. 598

Deir al-Saleeb psychiatric hospital to which she had been transferred.[87] By no means an outlier case, the recruiters as well as the domestic worker agencies often become involved in the disciplining of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, "Some Lebanese employers deliberately take their domestic workers to the agency for disciplinary purposes, knowing that they will be beaten or threatened."[88] Or, as was the case with an Ethiopian migrant worker, Betty, in Kousha, Lebanon, these women may be raped.

LBCI first showed Betty's story in March of 2014, which the Migrant-Rights.org group picked up and expounded upon. According to Betty's testimony, her employer of a week took her to the recruiting agency to be 'returned.' Another dehumanizing aspect of this system of contract slavery, employers have the right to return a worker if they are dissatisfied, at which point the worker will be exchanged for a new worker. Betty, having been exchanged through a process further comodifying her body, then experienced what can only be described as the pinnacle of human depravity:

> Upon arrival, the recruitment agency's young secretary called Betty an "animal" and promised "to teach her a lesson." She then summoned in a 40-year-old Lebanese man, whose job description entails "disciplining domestic workers." He proceed to slap Betty and ordered her to strip. When she refused, he told her she has been accused of thievery and that he must search her. Following the search, he tells the secretary that "she is clean" only to start beating Betty with his belt. He then rapes Betty, the sound of her screams reaching the secretary who does nothing to intervene, and threatens her to keep quiet about the incident. Medical reports later evidenced the abuse to Betty's body, including to her genitalia.[89]

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[87] "Lebanon."
[88] Jureidini and Moukarbel, "Female Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Lebanon." pg. 598
[89] "Ethiopian Domestic Worker 'disciplined' by Rape in Lebanon."

Betty's testimony is extremely difficult to watch, as she breaks down in the middle of her story crying for a trauma that the Kafala system facilitated. Though this paper attempts to avoid an Olympics of suffering, or the privileging of one suffering over another, Betty's story represents the utter depravity of the Lebanese Kafala system, and the dangers surrounding it. Betty was recruited into a system that relies on the trade of human bodies, permitting certain ethnicities to be "discounted" or "traded in" for a better version. Then, a Lebanese female dehumanized Betty. Betty was demeaned, demonized, and berated as the male in the recruiting office forced her to take off her clothes and be searched. The man then beat her, and proceeded to rape her. The secretary heard the woman's screams and did nothing.

This story illustrates both how some Lebanese women's practices of dehumanizing migrant domestic workers reproduce the patriarchal system on the migrant workers' bodies, while also showing silence in the face of abuse in its most extreme form. Though Betty's case is unique in that she filed a complaint, hired a lawyer, and is currently receiving support from a new employer, the abuse she experienced is likely anything but unusual. The answer to the question of why are so many migrant domestic workers committing suicide seems painfully obvious, yet many Lebanese continue to ignore the pervasive discrimination and near unfathomable abuse that migrant domestic workers consistently experience. These stories illustrate how simply treating an employee well will never be enough to stop these events. Instead, Lebanese women must demand change and no longer participate in the Kafala system.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter begins by outlining the theoretical concept of social identity, showing how women are more likely to commit to a social project in the long run if they identity as activists and maintain strong personal identification with the activist group. KAFA's rejection of the negative and racist responses on its post for Raise Shawwa's Voice simultaneously strengthened the group's identity boundaries. Though it likely was not enough to deter future comments or the participation of racist women in its movement, it set a precedent for condemning social stratification and maintaining group unity as women progress towards equal rights in Lebanon.

In my interview with Maya Ammar, she revealed that there was not yet a women's movement in Lebanon. She stated that there currently was not wide enough support among Lebanese women to successfully undertake such a move towards full equality. Despite the current status of women's rights in Lebanon, KAFA is arguably creating a structural base to prepare for a women's movement. Through its threefold strategy of Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala System, KAFA undertakes multiple campaigns aimed at reaching all parts of the Lebanese Public. By engaging the state apparatus, laws may be created to provide safety and legal recourse for women suffering from domestic violence, as well as creating the necessary funds to subsidize these activities. KAFA's engagement of the public brings wider support to the organization, inspiring those identifying as activists to take a dedicated role in the future movement for women's rights. Currently, KAFA's engagement of the Kafala system also illustrates the weaknesses in creating a women's

movement. An idealized women's rights organization that is able to put aside all identity markers remains an improbable reality. The violent history of Lebanon, strict sectarian boundaries, and lack of full civil personal status laws all contribute to the problems with the Kafala system and Lebanese women's response to it. Yet the active awareness of such differences and constant struggle toward suppressing patriarchal tendencies is an achievable goal. The outcome in successfully engaging the Kafala system would be an indication of KAFA's preparation of the Lebanese community for a women's rights movement through including all women living in Lebanon in the organization's resistance.

Thesis Conclusion

This thesis comes at a time when KAFA finds itself in a unique position within Lebanon to both inform and alter society. Many of Lebanon's human rights issues stem from the country's violent past and delicate balance between religious and secular politics. Often acting as a hindrance to positive change, many political leaders believe this is a price worth paying in order to maintain religious peace in the country. Yet this negative peace certainly does not foster an open-minded atmosphere in the country, preferring instead to cater to the patriarchal religious rulers and influential Lebanese elite. This may be one of the more difficult paradoxes that KAFA confronts: ideally, secular civil laws need to be established in order to create the possibility for gender equality in Lebanon; yet in order for the laws to be created, women need to alter the patriarchal political system thus far refusing to upset the relationship with religious leaders. Realistically, the way to achieve secular civil status laws without women upending the entire patriarchal system first would necessitate a steady building up of both female and male support to spark a women's movement in Lebanon. This type of movement foreseeably would involve enough of the Lebanese population protesting and demanding women's rights making it impossible for the Lebanese government *not* to listen.

Currently, KAFA does not yet have this large of a base; however, all indications show that KAFA's methods of gaining participants and activists has steadily increased and that such a movement may be possible. According to Maya Ammar, KAFA currently receives approximately 215 calls a month to KAFA's helpline, adding up to 2500-2700

calls per year. In the month following the Zalfa campaign, KAFA received double the amount of cases, 71, than the month before (35). This campaign also reached 500,000 people on Facebook. Additionally, public interest continues to grow in the group, with 600 college-aged youth trying to volunteer with KAFA in 2014 alone. KAFA's followers are growing at a faster pace than the small organization can currently handle. Though this will be one of the challenges for KAFA going forward, it is an encouraging sign that the younger generation is ready and excited for change.

KAFA's founding in 2005 launched a new era for widespread awareness regarding gender-based violence and migrant domestic worker's abuses rights in Lebanon. Perhaps this increase in public awareness stems from increased public access to information and media resulting from further technological advances. Yet collectively my research and anecdotal information lead me to believe that KAFA's campaigns have largely influenced the influx and dissemination of informational material to the masses. This is certainly not to say that women's organizations were not doing major work for women in Lebanon. On the contrary, women's rights organizations assisted in created beneficial policies to improve women's conditions following the end of the 15 year Lebanese Civil War in 1990. One of KAFA's many contributions, however, continues to be the way in which they de-privatize formerly discreet family situations while also putting specific names and faces to cases of gender-based violence. My interview with Maya Ammar reinforces these findings when she noted that KAFA intentionally uses the faces of family members and friends and the names of victims of domestic violence so that their stories could no longer be ignored. She said that this forced people to think of

their own relationships with family members, inspiring motivation for action through empathy. This tactic is problematic because it relies on the premise that gender-based violence can only be cared about if a person can relate the problem to herself or himself, instead of seeing it as a problem because it threatens basic human rights. Despite the possible issues with this rhetoric, KAFA currently must utilize every strategy available to stop the endemic issue of domestic violence in the region. Additionally, redemption may be found in this tactic through its ability to ground information on domestic violence in very real tragedies that cannot be simply dismissed as hearsay.

KAFA carries out its campaigns through a blitzkrieg of informational strategies, flooding the Lebanese public with facts from a multitude of mediums and confronting gender-based violence from various angles. The effects of this are quite extraordinary; by maintaining consistent attention to all campaign angles but alternating its emphasis, it is able to build support across campaign platforms. It is possible that if KAFA focused all its energy on one aspect of gender-rights for an extended period, that goal could be completed faster than is currently the case. What KAFA is doing, however, instead builds a lasting platform for women's rights to achieve long-term success and tackle issues that previously have never been addressed, while solidifying the group's identity through demanding its followers to support all human rights. By utilizing a variety of media, such as newsprint, online news websites, posters, billboards, pamphlets, commercials, television news stations, various websites, and social media, KAFA creates a model for an egalitarian approach to women's rights. Its methods allow for a wider dissemination of information than traditional methods. Using a wide array of mediums, KAFA also

incorporates burgeoning technology into its campaigns, promoting social progress alongside technological progress. In addition to these methods reaching a wide array of people from various backgrounds, they allow for better access to the organization's tools and help for situations of gender-based violence and migrant domestic worker abuses.

KAFA's campaigns that I discuss in this thesis may be categorized into the following strategies: Engaging the State Apparatus, Engaging the Public, and Engaging the Kafala System. Through engaging these three distinct yet connected realms, KAFA attacks Lebanon's patriarchal systems of oppression from multiple angles. This will allow them to grow as an organization, encouraging activists that participate in one campaign to pledge support for others.

The Engaging the State Apparatus campaign targets aspects of gender-based violence that are explicitly affected by state laws and judicial rulings. To date, KAFA's arguably biggest achievement was its creation and lobbying for Law 293, the law to protect women and children from domestic violence. Though the law in its current form is problematic following its many amendments, including the continued refusal to criminalize marital rape, it certainly is a landmark victory for women's rights in Lebanon. Other parts of Engaging the State Apparatus include challenging the personal status laws in Lebanon, which continue to discriminate against and among women, and demanding change in the Internal Security Force. A common perception among Lebanese women persists that the ISF members are as likely to sexually harass women as they are to help them in situations of violence. KAFA realizes the necessity to change this reality so that women experiencing domestic violence have an option for recourse.

The majority of KAFA's campaigns promote public involvement through various protests, teaching clinics, and demonstrations, but the Engaging the Public's goal is its appeal for continued public intervention. The two campaigns within this strategy are the A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride campaign and the Zalfa campaign. The taxi ride in particular questions the public's ability to intervene in situations of violence. Zalfa instead provides an alternative medium for inquisitive audiences and victims of domestic violence alike through her form as an avatar. This degree of personalized interaction forms emotional connections between the audience and Zalfa. The final campaign strategy creates the deepest divisions between KAFA's followers but also defines the organization's identity.

The Engaging the Kafala system exists as its own strategy, specifically because so many Lebanese view migrant domestic worker's rights as outside the spectrum of Lebanese women's rights. KAFA has prioritized battling the trafficking of women since the organization's founding, and recently launched its biggest campaign to date confronting biases against migrant workers. The Raise Shawwa's Voice campaign brings to light important questions of how so many migrant domestic worker suicides, about one per week, could be allowed to occur without intensified public inquiry. Raise Shawwa's Voice prompts users to take an active role in holding the system accountable, similar to its Name and Shame campaign in Engaging the State Apparatus. As previously noted, KAFA would like to see the destruction of the Kafala system and migrant domestic workers' reception of full rights under Lebanon's Labor Laws. It is important to note that KAFA does not advocate for the complete dissolution of migrant domestic workers'

presence in Lebanon altogether; though the current system is dangerous for the workers, many of the women working in Lebanon need the job to survive. Yet it isn't enough for these women to gain work in Lebanon, they must also maintain the right to leave any job, have protection under Lebanon's Labor Laws, and formulate an integral part of the women's rights movement in order to partake in necessary recourse against possible violence.

The analysis in this thesis brings up some interesting, although not wholly unexpected, conclusions regarding the state of women's rights in Lebanon. For most of KAFA's campaigns, females overwhelmingly supported KAFA and its goals. The majority of negative feedback came from males, and even still this feedback was in the minority. Many comments, especially regarding campaigns for Engaging the State Apparatus, are positive towards KAFA but challenge the Lebanese political system. This feedback is a sign of an actively engaged audience, praising KAFA's victories but constantly challenging the reality or effectiveness of certain campaigns like those involving the ISF. Additionally, KAFA's statistics regarding the increased number of participants and possible volunteers with the organization support my own analysis.

In addition to my analysis of KAFA's campaigns and user feedback, this thesis begins the much-needed work addressing several holes in academic research regarding women's rights in Lebanon. Much of the current literature on women's rights revolves around political familialism and citizenship laws in Lebanon. To my knowledge, a case study focusing on a specific women's rights group does not exist in this context. I show in my thesis how the direction of influence does not only flow from patriarchal structures

towards women in society, but that influence also flows outward from women in society to affect political structure, and the very fabric of society. Placing women back in the designation as subject verses object, I utilize personal stories of women and construct analysis where women have a primary role in changing the world around them.

Finally, my thesis contributes to scholarship on migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. Current literature, though still quite limited, primarily focuses on the structure of the Kafala system, and the legal discrepancies with it. In contrast, my work prioritizes the voice of the migrant domestic workers through allowing their experiences to speak through my writing. Amrita Pande's article, "From "Balcony Talk" and "Practical Prayers" to Illegal Collectives: Migrant Domestic Workers and Meso-Level Resistance in Lebanon" greatly influenced the framing of my thesis to construct the work of KAFA and migrant domestic workers as acts of resistance instead of passive endurance. Pande's work breaks the construct of a one-dimensional worker, to show that not only do migrant domestic workers have multi-faceted personalities, but also they are active participants in their own struggle for rights. Interesting work begs to be done looking at the webs of resistance work formed between groups such as the Migrant Domestic Workers Consortium, Lebanon's Anti-Racism Movement, and KAFA. I kept this very important perspective in mind when focusing my work on Lebanese women's reactions to KAFA's campaigns and Facebook posts regarding rights for migrant domestic workers. The overwhelmingly negative feedback from females associated with KAFA demands further attention by both KAFA and other scholarship. Not only is this feedback representative of

women activists reproducing patriarchal systems on women perceived as 'lesser' but it also problematizes the current concept of feminism in Lebanon.

Undoubtedly, KAFA is one of the most relevant human rights organizations in Lebanon today. The organization's work is unparalleled, though certainly not alone in its endeavors. KAFA's organizational structure and unique engagement of Lebanese society at large provides a fascinating case study for Lebanese women's rights groups. Through building a solid base of supporters and activists united in a common goal for equality for all women, KAFA is positioned to ignite a powerful resistance movement in Lebanon.

This paper illustrates the persistent need for socio-economic disparities to be read into gender discussions. Nancy Frasier's framework of the counter public is not enough; the existence of patriarchal systems of power results in women reproducing patriarchy upon weaker, and often lower class, women. Though those women of middle and higher socioeconomic statuses desire more rights as women, these same women often accept restricted rights for other women when it benefits them. Due to Lebanon's history and unique sectarian system, class differentiation not only exists among religious groups but the religious groups themselves maintain a socioeconomic hierarchy. Nationalism remains another integral indicator for class and gender rights, as those outside of Lebanese national belonging often are the most vulnerable. This thesis raises the question of how does an organization fight against gender-based violence and fight for women's rights when women have different access to power? How will an organization include the most vulnerable of society both in its decision-making processes within the group as well as the beneficiaries of gender equality? Certainly Lebanese women have different

viewpoints and each woman's background informs her decision making process. Just as KAFA promotes the campaign for Shawwa to raise her own voice and the voices of other migrant domestic workers, so too must it find a way not just to speak for all women, but be the bullhorn for all women to speak through.

Appendix

Table: 4.1 : All Responses to Campaigns

	Likes	Shares	Comments	Comments Analyzed	Comments made by KAFA
Name and Shame 1	56	35	26	26	4
Name and Shame 2	28	2	6	4	0
Name and Shame 3	16	24	7	7	0
General White Ribbon Campaign Photo	20	4	3	3	1
ISF 2 Males	352	183	25	19	0
ISF Male	502	214	38	32	13
ISF Female	994	271	36	27	1
ISF Female 2	161	35	3	2	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride	157	35	8	5	2
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 2	122	54	3	3	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 3	242	169	3	3	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 4	108	43	6	5	0
Zalfa 1	718	136	35	27	1
Zalfa 2	751	88	20	19	0
Raise Shawwa's Voice***	289	25	29	77	2
SMS Migrant Domestic Worker Message	383	462	183	41	0
Melika Begum	188	25	53 (72?)	72	0

Table: 4.2 : Information broken down into categorized Female responses

	Comments Analyzed	Female Positive	Female Negative	Female Government Critique	Female Indecipherable	Female Tagging	Female Other
Name and Shame 1	26	5	0	0	0	0	0
Name and Shame 2	4	4	0	0	0	0	0
Name and Shame 3	7	2	0	0	0	0	1
General White Ribbon Campaign Photo	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
ISF 2 Males	19	11	0	3	1	1	0
ISF Male	32	8 Comments/ 7 Females	1	7 Comments/ 6 Females	0	0	0
ISF Female	27	17	0	4	1	0	0
ISF Female 2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride	5	2	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 2	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 3	3	1	0	0	0	1	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 4	5	4	1	0	0	0	0
Zalfa 1	27	18	0	1	1	0	0
Zalfa 2	19	9	0	0	3	0	0
Raise Shawwa's Voice	77	16 Comments/9 Females	42 Comments/ 10 Females	0	0	1	2
SMS Migrant Domestic Worker Message	41	24	0	0	0	1	0
Melika Begum	72	0	46 Comments /36 Females	0	0	3	6

Table: 4.3 : Information broken down into categorized Male responses

	Comments Analyzed	Male Positive	Male Negative	Male Government Critique	Male Indecipherable	Male Tagging	Male Other
Name and Shame 1	26	5 Comments /4 Males	5 Comments /3 Males	0	0	0	0
Name and Shame 2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Name and Shame 3	7	0	1	0	1	0	2
General White Ribbon Campaign Photo	3	2 Comments/ 1 Male	0	0	0	0	0
ISF 2 Males	19	1	1	0	2	0	0
ISF Male	32	0	1	2	1	0	0
ISF Female	27	1	0	2	0	0	0
ISF Female 2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride	5	1	2	0	0	0	1
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
A Very Disturbing Taxi Ride 4	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zalfa 1	27	3	1	0	0	0	0
Zalfa 2	19	2	5 comments /3 Males	0	0	0	0
Raise Shawwa's Voice	77	5	1	0	0	0	0
SMS Migrant Domestic Worker Message	41	7 comments /5 Males	2	0	0	5 Comments/ 3 Males	2
Melika Begum	72	11 Comments /7 Males	6 Comments /3 Males	0	0	0	0

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